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Rousseau rose to prominence arguing against the Enlightenment, the strongest intellectual 
current of his time. As he argued in his first important work, the advancement of learning 
(particularly in the realm of science and technology) is not always conducive to an individual’s 
happiness or community’s wellbeing. Man’s technological mastery of nature is the result of a 
reorientation of scientific inquiry that is ambivalent to normative questions; “what can be done?” 
has replaced “what should be done?” as a guiding scientific principal. Because it eschews 
normative standards, modern science has raised many ethical dilemmas that cannot be answered 
by modern natural science alone. Going forward, we must determine if it is possible for the raw 
power of modern science to be guided by the humanities in order to ensure the morality of scientific 
innovation. Such regulation is necessary, even if this means a rebirth of the humanities, as modern 
society cannot continue on its current trajectory. A rebirth of the humanities would result in a field 
built on synthetic reasoning, a way of thought that has been put forward as a viable alternative to 
 Value-Relativism, with the goal of creating a field capable of commanding respect – thereby to 
guide, and where necessary to rein in, the sciences.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The Age of Enlightenment radically changed European culture, forever altering scientific 
discovery, artistic development, and social thought, as well as political and religious institutions. 
This sweeping movement gave rise to modern day society by giving us a new guiding ethic, a 
cheerfulness about progress and scientific advancement no matter its cost to traditional ways of 
organizing society, as well as moral and religions claims in particular. The Enlightenment was so 
encompassing that much of society has not stopped to consider the possible costs that have been 
associated with this movement. Exempt from this sentiment is philosopher Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, who voiced his concerns as early as 1750. Many of Rousseau’s opinions are still 
relevant today.  
It is possible that an understanding of Rousseau’s work will help today’s society evaluate 
the overarching effects of the Enlightenment, and in the process help answer some of the many 
ethical dilemmas that society faces today. Despite our advances and rapid technological 
developments, an in-depth inquiry into a movement that took place three centuries ago is 
necessary, as modern society is in crisis.12 The North Atlantic world is wealthier and more 
powerful than it has ever been, but community and communal bonds are fraying. Since WWII 
there has been an underlying fear and a political hopelessness throughout the country. There are 
some who turn a blind eye to this, and claim that the country is fine politically, morally, and 
economically. Even those who willingly recognize the problem must conquer another hurdle – if 
the country really is in crisis they must determine a logical reason why the country is in crisis. To 
                                             
1 Masters Roger D. Beyond Relativism: Science and Human Values. (Hanover: NH: University 
Press of New England, 1987. 
2 Joseph Ratzinger and Marcello Pera, Without Roots: The West, Relativism, Christianity, Islam. 
(New York, NY: Basic Books, 2006). 
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answer both of these questions – if the country is in crisis and why – it is most helpful to look at 
the work that was done when the movement was in its infancy.  
The modern scientific project, as initiated by Francis Bacon in the mid-1600s, was intended 
to aid in the relief of man’s estate, and this project was successful. However, we must ask ourselves 
if the amenities that we possess today justify the erosion of moral and ethical principles. We must 
look past the added comfort and freedom of technological advancement and question whether 
modern science has been as helpful as was originally anticipated or if it has simply added to our 
anxieties in many subtle ways. Our industrial factories are slowly destroying the world, we have 
altered the genome, and we are arguably less concerned now, than ever before, with the sanctity 
of life – the very basis of any democratic regime. We have eschewed our traditions but have no 
clear path going forward; in fact, ours may be the first community in the history of the world to 
embrace such radical change whilst remaining ambivalent to where we are headed. Such 
ambivalence has prevented our democratic regime from answering the many moral dilemmas that 
our modern society is facing – such as: should we open or close our doors to Syrian refugees? Will 
global warming cause economic upheaval and unwanted immigration and what, if anything, should 
be done? Are we capable of preventing New Age warfare such as terrorism and genocide?3 Are 
some medical advancements devoid of morality? And will racial tensions continue in the West? 
These grave situations only constitute some of the dilemmas facing modern society, and 
unreflective scientific advancement will only continue to lead to such cataclysmic developments.  
Though the current political and ecological climate is in disarray, it is possible that it is not 
too late to come to a deeper understanding, form a clear picture of the future, and take the correct 
                                             
3 Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York, NY: 
Penguin Books, 2012), 275. 
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steps going forward. Examination of Rousseau’s several works in tandem with several more 
modern works by Steven Pinker, a Johnstone Professor of Psychology at Harvard University and 
Roger D. Masters, a Nelson A. Rockefeller Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, could 
potentially give us the answers we seek. While each of these works examine the crises that society 
is currently facing, they do not all hold entirely similar beliefs. Rousseau would argue that the 
issues of modern society stemmed from the Enlightenment, which contributed to the degradation 
of morality and decay of society by encouraging man to erroneously believe that with scientific 
advancement he was akin to a god. This belief completely altered man’s principles, his way of 
thinking, and what he deems to be necessary for happiness. It is due to man’s misunderstanding of 
his place in society that Rousseau holds that today’s issues are not easily remedied. Pinker would 
argue that society has made a great deal of progress throughout history, and although there is still 
a great deal left to do, he claims that there is a great deal to look forward to. It is possible that while 
the situation may not be as dire as Rousseau presents, it may also be true that Pinker is much too 
optimistic about the current state of society. Examination of the issues of modern day society may 
show that it is possible that the answer lies somewhere in between what has been presented.  
Any attempt to understand the dilemmas facing modern society should bring us to an 
examination of Rousseau’s philosophy. Such an examination necessitates consideration of the 
ethical dilemmas that have been raised by modern science and the rise of Value-Relativism as the 
dominant way of thought. Additionally, it is essential to determine whether the arts and sciences 
are pernicious to human happiness, as well as whether morality is innate to human beings or if it 
must be studied. Beyond this, one must also determine where society’s guidance comes from and 
whether the scientific field is capable of answering these ethical dilemmas on its own or if it must 
turn to the social sciences – which may mean a rebirth of the humanities based upon synthetic 
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(inductive) reasoning. While Rousseau was rightly awarded the prize by the Academy of Dijon in 
1750, it is also possible that this message may not be the best suited for men and women to develop 
in practice, and that Rousseau’s philosophy is hopelessly naïve. Regardless of how we come to 
judge Rousseau’s philosophy, there is much to be said for such erudition and the possible 
ramifications that come from simply knowing.  
 
SYNOPSIS OF ROUSSEAU’S CRITICISM OF THE SCIENCES AND THE ARTS: THE FIRST AND SECOND 
DISCOURSE    
Rousseau, a philosophical writer of the eighteenth century, gained both prominence and 
disfavor with his writings. Though vastly popular, most of Rousseau’s works were controversial – 
especially when held against the backdrop of his own life – and several of them were not only 
banned, but publicly burned. Even in his time, Rousseau disagreed with the trajectory of political 
and social events, and because of this, his ideas were contrary to public opinion and the 
Enlightenment in general, which was gaining popularity and support throughout Europe during 
Rousseau’s lifetime. Due to the Enlightenment, which emphasized scientific development and 
placed a renewed interest upon the development of philosophical reason, knowledge was valued 
more highly than ever before. Contrary to this sweeping movement, Rousseau’s Discourse on the 
Sciences and the Arts, generally known as the First Discourse, praised ignorance and denounced 
scientific innovation and the arts in general. Among his many radical claims, it is Rousseau’s 
disparagement of sciences and learning – as pernicious to human happiness and goodness – that is 
perhaps his most discomforting teaching. Rousseau justifies this view by stating that the raw power 
of the sciences has allowed man to mistake what his true place is within society and the cosmos at 
large. Even with this seemingly audacious claim, Rousseau shows an understanding of political 
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society, human character, and human happiness that is seldom rivaled and which should be further 
explored.  
 
Rousseau’s First Discourse, written in 1750, answers, “Whether the restoration of the 
Sciences and the Arts has contributed to the purification of morals.” Here, despite knowing that in 
some cases he would be misunderstood and ridiculed, Rousseau confidently claims that the 
restoration of the arts and the sciences has led to moral decay throughout society.4 Rousseau defend 
the position he has taken in his First Discourse by reiterating that it is not science that he seeks to 
abuse, but virtue that he wishes to defend.5 
 To support this bold claim that the sciences and the arts have been injurious to morality, 
Rousseau examined several prominent ancient civilizations. He compared those that valued the 
arts and the sciences – such as Egypt, China, and Greece – to Sparta, a city state in ancient Greece 
which denounced both the arts and scientific developments. Rousseau argues that it is not the 
continued development of the arts and sciences that makes a civilization great, but that what is 
great for a civilization is found elsewhere.6 A great civilization, he says, should support a culture 
that recognizes what it is and does not make pretenses about being something else.7 It is through 
this comparison that Rousseau hopes to show that we are often “deceived by the appearance of 
right,” which continues even today, as a great many scholars would favor Greece over Sparta – a 
culture that closely followed the laws of nature.8 Sparta had a simplistic society based upon warfare 
                                             
4 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, trans. Victor 
Gourevitch (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 3. 
5 Ibid., 5. 
6 Ibid., 10. 
7 Ibid., 7. 
8 Ibid., 5 & 135. 
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and a mentality that stressed the Darwinian notion of survival of the fittest, many centuries before 
evolutionary theory was first described. It is this setup of the Spartan civilization that so appealed 
to Rousseau, as he thought that this turbulent environment better lent itself to man’s constitution 
and brought with it fewer temptations which could lead to man’s discontentment – happiness being 
the ultimate aim. Additionally, Rousseau asserts that what many would consider the barbarisms of 
Spartan culture are preferable to the artfully fake cultures of Egypt, China, and Greece – cultures 
which place more value upon erudition than probity.9 Rousseau notes that, “If the Sciences purified 
morals, if they taught men to shed their blood for the Fatherland, if they animated courage; the 
Peoples of China should be wise, free, and invincible.”10 However, this is not the case, and no 
amount of scientific understanding has been able to save this civilization from an “ignorant and 
coarse Tartar.”11 Rousseau argues that not only is upstanding morality easier to maintain when the 
civilization is more simplistic, as there are fewer temptations, but there is much less possibility 
that man would be distracted by the desire for material possessions.12 Rousseau shows in his 
Discourses that the states that were best for mankind were simple. As he argues in Emile: Or on 
Education, human happiness requires an equilibrium between man’s desires and his capacity to 
satisfy these desires (with all human faculties in operation). Mankind can only desire that which 
is known to exist; without such knowledge, man cannot be tormented by a vain and furious longing 
for the things he does not have.  
Simple, if coarse, civilizations such as Sparta kept men and women good, their desires 
calibrated to their lives. They discouraged vanity and were more adapt at warding off laziness, 
                                             
9 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, trans. Victor 
Gourevitch (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 5 -10. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 10. 
12 Ibid., 20. 
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which Rousseau condemns as a personal or social flaw. Love of fatherland had to be preserved in 
the hearts of the citizenry at all costs because it extends self-love outward, thereby suppressing 
vanity and self-concern – the drivers of unhappy lives. Patriotism is easier to preserve among those 
who must constantly work to survive, those who are not a stranger to hard labor, and do who not 
have leisure time to contemplate how their life could be better or how their state could be improved. 
Such hard labor would not only ensure that man is more willing to fight for his fatherland, but 
ensure that he is living within his means. Spartan culture, in contradistinction to that of Athens, 
provided a foundation upon which man could find true happiness.   
The pursuits that are developed by mankind, those that support the sciences and the arts 
within civilized culture, are all born from our vices. “Astronomy was born of superstition; 
Eloquence of ambition, hatred, flattery, lying; Geometry of greed; Physics of vain curiosity; all of 
them, even Ethics, of human pride.”13 Rousseau argues that “the sciences and the arts thus owe 
their birth to our vices,” which should cause us to doubt their rectitude.14 If we owed the 
development of the sciences and the arts to our virtue, we could better trust the possibility of their 
advantages.15 Rousseau recognizes that “[t]he mind has its needs, as has the body. The latter make 
up the foundations of society, the former make for it being agreeable.”16 But we have failed to 
realize that in our attempt to make society agreeable we have enslaved ourselves. And, so oblivious 
are we in this enslavement, that we continue to fortify our prison, Rousseau noted that “our souls 
have become corrupted in proportion as our Sciences and our Arts have advanced toward 
                                             
13 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, trans. Victor 
Gourevitch (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 16. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid., 6. 
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perfection.”17 Such misguided application of our efforts towards the perfection of the sciences and 
the arts have left mankind bereft of what is truly important – that which could contribute to man’s 
true happiness.  
 
In Rousseau’s Second Discourse, On the Origin and the Foundations of Inequality Among 
Men, he gives an account of the Origin of Inequality Among Men and the progression of inequality 
throughout time as man moved from the state of nature to political society. In this Discourse, which 
was less well received by the Academy of Dijon, Rousseau explores mankind’s history because he 
believes that man’s history, not his nature, is of primary political importance. However, while this 
provides a basis from which to form a society, this means that there is no end to strive for – no 
greater good to try and obtain. Because of this, man cannot evolve or develop. As Rousseau holds 
self-preservation, and self-preservation alone, to be most important and most noble aim for man.18 
This leaves open one glaring question: if man does not have an ultimate aim, where should 
mankind take its bearings from?19 The only answer Rousseau leaves us with is that we must look 
to the past, and man’s true nature – whatever that may be.  
To give this account, Rousseau had to describe what mankind was like in the state of nature, 
prior to civil society and its many amenities. During this time, man had not yet developed many 
of civil man’s faculties – including forethought and speech. The Savage man that Rousseau relates 
to the reader “has trouble giving thought in the morning to his needs in the evening.”20 Man, unlike 
                                             
17 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, trans. Victor 
Gourevitch (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 6-9. 
18 Steven Lange. Ethics: What is Public Administration? Lecture at Morehead State University, 
Rowan County, KY. Spring 2015. 
19 Ibid.   
20 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, trans. Victor 
Gourevitch (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 169. 
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the animals, was not even born with the instincts with which to take his bearings – he therefore 
looks to the animals, and appropriates each instinct he sees in the beasts.21 Savage man lived naked 
and unarmed, and despite this, Rousseau claims that it was Savage man that was “the most 
advantageously organized of all” the beasts. He was able to meet all of his needs, “stating his  
hunger beneath an oak, slaking his thirst at the first stream, finding his bed at the foot of the same 
tree that supplied his meal, and with that his needs are satisfied.”22 Being “[a]ccustomed from 
childhood to the inclemencies [sic] of the weather, and the rigor of the seasons, hardened to fatigue, 
and forced to defend naked and unarmed their life and their Prey against other ferocious Beasts or 
to escape them by running –” man was robust and no beast was man’s natural enemy.23 
It is with this understanding that Rousseau asserts that “[t]o go naked, to be without 
habitation, and to be deprived of all the useless things we believe so necessary is, then, not such a 
great misfortune.”24 The only preoccupation man had was his own self-preservation, and it was in 
such a manner that man lived a free and contented life. Inequality first arose in “he who first made 
himself clothes or a Dwelling,” and “thereby provided himself with things that are not very 
necessary, since he had done without them until then, and since it is not evident why he could not 
have tolerated as a grown man a mode of life he had tolerated from childhood.”25 The inequality 
that has arisen over time between individuals has been perpetuated by the possession of property, 
the enforcement of laws within society, and the constant search for perfection.  
                                             
21 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, trans. Victor 
Gourevitch (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 135. 
22 Ibid., 134. 
23 Ibid., 135-6. 
24 Ibid., 139. 
25 Ibid. 
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Rousseau’s Second Discourse also touches on the ways in which physical inequality has 
led to moral inequality. Often, those who have fewer material possessions are in possession of 
greater moral integrity. It is this correlation between material goods and immorality, that Rousseau 
argues allows us to find fault with political society and its advancements – as society has led to 
moral depravity. In this, we can see a logical connection between the First and Second Discourses, 
as the arts and sciences have furthered inequality among men, not only with regards to their 
material possessions, but their moral well-being. By living outside of our means, we have enslaved 
ourselves.  
While the destitution and moral depravity that Rousseau highlights within modern society 
does not seem favorable, there are very few options that we can turn to. In practice, unlike in 
theory, we cannot go back to the state of nature, and although many may espouse the benefits of a 
“simple time,” history moves forward, not backward. In light of this, Rousseau recommends two 
possible courses of action. The first is that we seek to understand the true nature of virtue as 
practiced by exceptional individuals and communities (the noble savage, Spartans, Romans, the 
Idealized Genevans of the Second Discourse), and once we come to an understanding, we 
collectively learn to live in a way that approximates that virtue under our new circumstances.26 
The second option open to us is that we become independent, and content ourselves in intellectual 
development – an option that most closely mimics the state of nature.27 This second option, we 
will find, is available to very few people, as Rousseau shows that not every individual is suited for 
intellectual development.   
                                             
26 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, trans. Victor 
Gourevitch (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 152.  
27 Ibid.  
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Rousseau’s metaphysical examination of man showed that it was the concept of 
“perfectibility” that gave rise to man’s miseries.28 The concept of perfectibility has allowed man 
to attempt to remove himself from the state of nature, and in Rousseau’s esteem, making man 
“lower than the Beast,” by increasing his desires to the point that they exceed man’s physical 
capacity.29 It was the idea of man’s perfectibility that led to the rise of modern science and the 
ethical dilemmas that have stemmed from these unregulated technological advances. The desire 
for more led to the development of reason. Perfectibility, “the sources of all of man’s miseries,” 
was what brought man “out of that original condition in which he would spend tranquil and 
innocent days.”30 It is perfectibility that allowed for man’s “enlightenment and his errors, his vices 
and his virtues to bloom,” and that which “eventually makes him his own and Nature’s tyrant.”31 
Perfectibility is the source of human unhappiness as it laid the foundation for desire. It was desire 
that enslaved man, making him constantly desirous of more and ensuring that what he had would 
never be enough. Additionally, it was the concept of perfectibility that allowed man to believe that 
he could master nature and elevate himself to a status that was equivalent to that of a god.  
 
ETHICAL DILEMMAS RAISED BY SCIENCE AND THE ARTS  
The seventeenth century was the beginning of the modern scientific project. This modern 
project was aimed at “improving the condition of the human race” through the relief of suffering 
by “enhancing health, and enriching life.”32 Science took the place philosophy once occupied, thus 
                                             
28 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, trans. Victor 
Gourevitch (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 140-1. 
29 Ibid., 141. 
30 Ibid.. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Yuval Levin, The Moral Challenge of Modern Science. (The New Atlantis: A Journal of 
Technology and Society. Fall 2006), 33. 
12 
 
becoming the “grand human endeavor,” attracting the best and the brightest to the field.33 In many 
ways science during the Enlightenment was a “profoundly moral enterprise,” with Francis Bacon 
arguing that science should be for “the glory of the Creator and the relief of man’s estate.”  34 
Science was not just to be judged by its material products, but by its influence on how humanity 
has come to think.35 When done in this manner, “science is far from morally neutral,” as it is done 
for the greater good.36 However, the modern scientific project has moved further away from this 
philosophy over time. The National Academy of Science has stated that today’s science would 
“examine only the scientific and medical aspects of the issues” and to let others decide 
“fundamental moral, ethical, religious, and societal questions.”37 As such, science today is done 
simply to satisfy vain curiosity – in the hopes of profoundly altering the physical aspects of man’s 
life – and is no longer done for “the glory of the Creator.”38 Additionally, science has changed 
position from inquiring what would be good for society to simply questioning “what can be 
done?”39 This change has altered the goals of man to “[a]void[] the worst, rather than achieve[] the 
best.”40 It is also due to sentiments such as this that Leo Strauss calls our modern science 
“instrumental and nothing but instrumental.”41 If employed without an eye towards what is morally 
correct, science is merely a technological advancement that can help facilitate such atrocities as 
                                             
33 Yuval Levin, The Moral Challenge of Modern Science. (The New Atlantis: A Journal of 
Technology and Society. Fall 2006), 33. 
34 Francis Bacon in Yuval Levin, The Moral Challenge of Modern Science. (The New Atlantis: 
A Journal of Technology and Society. Fall 2006), 33. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 34. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Yuval Levin, The Moral Challenge of Modern Science. (The New Atlantis: A Journal of 
Technology and Society. Fall 2006), 45. 
40 Ibid., 37. 
41 Leo Strauss, On the Intention of Rousseau, Social Research, 14:1/4 (1947) Extracted from 
PC1 FUN Text, published by ProQuest Information and Learning Company, 4.  
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were committed during the Second World War. Even in the Seventeenth Century, the fact that 
science had the potential to be so dangerous was not lost on Bacon, who stated that the moral 
neutrality of science made it potentially dangerous.42  
While the National Academy may have decided not to answer the ethical questions that 
science poses, scientific developments, now more than ever, raise many new and unavoidable 
policy questions with inescapable ethical implications. Such policy questions include whether or 
not stem cell research should be pursued, whether or not lab grown meat should be funded, or if 
nuclear weapons are worth the possible risk to human life and environmental well-being. 
Additionally, we must question if the government should allow scientist to incorporate three sets 
of DNA into one child, whether or not policy should permit genetic testing on children post- 
conception, whether abortion should be permitted in all cases or greatly limited, and whether or 
not birth control methods pose a moral dilemma. Beyond this, it must be decided whether or not 
the proposed benefits of medical marijuana outweigh the possible risks, whether the prolonged 
continuation of life support for a comatose patient is worth the exorbitant fee, and if euthanasia is 
a humane choice for those who are suffering. While modern science allows us to practice any 
number of these options, it does not explore the ethicality of any of these possibilities or whether 
the “technical advances can be neutral to the ends or purposes to which they are put.”43 
As Rousseau reminds his readers, scientific advancement is not always in pursuit of the 
best possible good. In fact, Rousseau states that as “our Sciences and our Arts have advanced 
                                             
42 Yuval Levin, The Moral Challenge of Modern Science. (The New Atlantis: A Journal of 
Technology and Society. Fall 2006), 32. 
43 Roger D. Masters. Beyond Relativism: Science and Human Values. (Hanover: NH: University 
Press of New England, 1987), 21.  
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towards perfection,” “our souls have become corrupted in proportion.”44 Scientific advancement, 
both now and at the start of the Enlightenment, has sought that which would alleviate many of the 
strains put on man by nature. Though scientists were successful in doing this – for example, 
through the adaptation of home goods such as air conditioning and refrigeration, or medical 
advancements such as the development of penicillin and vaccines – they have not always stopped 
to ask if these innovations are the best possible good in relation to morality – believing it fell 
outside their prevue. This situation is made obvious when scientific advancements are examined 
in tandem with questions of morality and how one should best live their life. Masters found that 
there was a striking correlation between the rise and ease of home refrigeration and divorce, and 
while “we tend to hold the people who divorce responsible,” this could be part of a “much larger 
by-product of moral decay.”45 Additionally, whenever “the pursuit of health through science and 
medicine conflicts with even the deepest commitments of modern life—to equality, to rights, to 
self-government, or to protection of the weak—science and medicine typically carry the day.”46 
This can be seen with many of the advancements in biotechnology – especially with regards to 
embryonic stem cell research and the genetic screening of embryos.47 
Science can claim to be morally neutral as it does not explicitly examine principles of good 
or bad.48 It does not inquire as to what the primary good is, which leaves multiple interpretations. 
Descartes (1596-1650) claimed that the “new science should be directed to the advancement of 
                                             
44 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, trans. Victor 
Gourevitch (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 9. 
45 Roger D. Masters. Beyond Relativism: Science and Human Values. (Hanover: NH: University 
Press of New England, 1987), 25-6. 
46 Yuval Levin, The Moral Challenge of Modern Science. (The New Atlantis: A Journal of 
Technology and Society. Fall 2006), 38. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 35. 
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health,” which he described as “without doubt the primary good and the foundation of all other 
goods of this life.”49 Hobbes (1500-1579) thought that the primary good was the “relief from the 
constant threat of death” while John Locke (1632-1704), “a bit less morbid,” saw the primary good 
as “avoiding violence and protecting life.”50 As American political analyst Yuval Levin points out, 
the conflicting views these philosophers hold regarding the highest human aim seem to be lowering 
the standard of what is considered a primary good.51 Levin states that this change in attitude is due 
to both modern science and a lowering of our overall aims – moving further and further away from 
what Aristotle would claim our true nature to be.52 Put another way, ambivalence to the ethical 
questions raised by scientific advancement required the whittling down what is good for human 
beings to the point of simply settling on the basics – as such, bodily health remains the highest 
agreed-upon standard. The problem is that the desiccation of ethics, though it made incredible 
scientific advancements possible, also made careful thinking on the rightness or wrongness of most 
policy questions – especially those having to do with how we should pursue of the limit of the 
advancement of natural science – all but impossible.  
 
The possible problematic ethicality of modern science is an issue that crosses party lines, 
and must simply come down to what is best.53 Additionally, even those with different political 
leanings have been known to have reservations about certain scientific advancements. “There are 
                                             
49 Descartes in Yuval Levin, The Moral Challenge of Modern Science. (The New Atlantis: A 
Journal of Technology and Society. Fall 2006), 36. 
50 Yuval Levin, The Moral Challenge of Modern Science. (The New Atlantis: A Journal of 
Technology and Society. Fall 2006), 36. 
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conservatives and Catholics who oppose birth control and abortion but favor nuclear power, and 
liberals who support the medical technologies that have revolutionized family planning while 
attacking industrial processes that threaten the environment.”54 The fact that many of the concerns 
regarding the advancement of technology can, and have, crossed party lines, necessitates that we 
must get past the conceptions of relativism – an ideology that thinks what is best is relative to (as 
well as contingent upon) an individual’s culture, time, or place – and come closer to a truer 
understanding of what is best for our political society.  
Relativism is a school of thought that most prominently says not to judge – as natural law 
does not provide for an absolute truth. This school of thought is a significant precondition of 
uncontrolled scientific advancement and, in turn, has been reinforced by the success of the modern 
scientific project. Relativism which asserts that there is no way of knowing what is good for 
mankind, or what better approximates rightness or wrongness, and ensures not only that there is 
no limit upon scientific advancement but strips all authority form the humanities. The several 
branches that make up Value-Relativism tell us that the “truth is whatever individuals feel it is,” 
or that truth is relative to our laws, our culture, or our [historical time-frame],” ensuring that the 
“truth” is no more than mere opinion.55 This perspective has enveloped society, ensuring that we 
are incapable of reigning in the raw power of the sciences, as it has eliminated all “rational basis 
from which we might criticize our personal ‘values.’”56 It has bolstered the modern scientific 
project because it allows us to maintain “our existing prejudices,” or to “dismiss views” we do not 
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like, as there is no truth – only an individual’s or culture’s opinion of the truth.57 We have forgotten 
that a basic knowledge of nature and human psychology is necessary for understanding both social 
life and politics.58 In place of this basic understanding, modern society has founded its 
understanding of moral and political issues upon an erroneous understanding of abstract rights – 
which has replaced actual judgement. However, we must acknowledge that it is only through the 
careful thinking on the rightness or wrongness of policy questions that one can instill limits upon 
scientific development and restore to the humanities the legitimacy the field once wielded.  
The adoption of Value-Relativism as the dominant way of thought has ensured that our 
society cannot, with any validity, judge other cultures or societies. These societies do not chose 
not to judge, but actually cannot judge, as knowledge is considered subjective. Such subjective 
knowledge can consist of “any collectively accepted system of beliefs,” which are also “relative 
to the society in which it was discovered and accepted.”59 60 It is this relativism that has allowed 
unsupported opinion to be accepted as fact. Today, society asserts that right and wrong are based 
upon perspective and how you, as an individual or within a culture or time in history, view 
occurrences – not fact. However, knowledge of reality is possible.61 Right and wrong cannot 
simply be a matter of opinion. Leon Harold Craig, Professor Emeritus at the University of Alberta, 
agrees with this dismissal of Value-Relativism along with the dismissal of the fact-value 
                                             
57 Patrick Malcolmson, Richard Myers, and Colin O’Connell, Liberal Education and Value 
Relativism: A Guide to Today’s B.A (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1996), 41-
2. 
58 Roger D. Masters. Beyond Relativism: Science and Human Values. (Hanover: NH: University 
Press of New England, 1987), 145. 
59 Barry Barnes and David Bloor, in Larry Laudan, Science and Relativism: Some Key 
Controversies in the Philosophy of Science (Science and Its Conceptual Foundations series) 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 106. 
60 Roger D. Masters. Beyond Relativism: Science and Human Values. (Hanover: NH: University 
Press of New England, 1987), 89. 
61 Ibid., 105. 
18 
 
distinction, appropriately claiming that for values to exist they must have their foundation in fact, 
thus dismissing the Fact-Value Dichotomy.62 It is Value-Relativism that has allowed us to forget 
that what is morally and ethically right or wrong is just as dependent upon factual information as 
is the field of science. Therefore, it goes without saying that an individual can be just as ignorant 
of what is right and what is wrong as they can be with regards to the scientific method. Morality, 
like the scientific method, must be mastered. Ethics must be taught at home and within universities. 
If not, individuals are no more likely to know what is ethically right than they are to know the 
principles of physics.   
Value relativism originated in the minds of great philosophers of the Enlightenment, 
including Locke in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, as well as the work done by 
Hobbes, Hume, Kant, and Arnold Brecht.63 Even though the misinterpretation of Rousseau 
himself. “Locke’s epistemology, which came to dominate Anglo-Saxon science, if not modern 
science more generally,” asserted that values came from society and positive law. Locke also 
initiated the movement of modern thought away from the principles of the ancients, asserting that 
modern philosophy was closer to reality. It is with this that Locke changed the trajectory of the 
world. The modern tradition was now based on science being “value-free with regards to the 
highest questions of right and wrong.”64 Modern science was effectively cut off from the freedom 
or ability to study the true values or “goals of human life.”65 Hume’s philosophy was “derived 
from Locke but interpreted in the light of subsequent thought.”66 Hume thought that “all our ideas 
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are copied from our impressions.”67 Interpretation of such claims have led individuals to think that 
the discovery of what is right and wrong is not possible, and that morality does not exist in fact.68 
Hume also emphasized the distinction between “is” and “ought” which laid the foundation for 
value-free science.69 Kant drove the final wedge between facts and values, and his view is “so 
widely shared in contemporary social science that it is almost invisible.”70 These philosophical 
decisions have led to the separation of science and human morality leading to many scientific 
developments that threaten the sanctity of human life. 
Value relativism overlooks essential components of everyday life, among which is our 
ability to discern right and wrong from what we observe to be true and right in our everyday 
experiences.  Marcello Pera, philosopher and former President of the Italian Senate, and Joseph 
Ratzinger, who later became Pope Benedict XVI, show in a collection of their letters the issues of 
relativism and the fact-value distinction. The continuation of Value-Relativism as a world view, 
as shown in their work Without Roots, will ensure that more of the important fundamentals of 
Western culture are eroded away. These men, one religious, one not, share the same worry – that 
relativism is eating away at the West’s roots. It is a nation’s roots that provide it with both nutrients 
and stability, without them, like any organism, the West would not be able to survive. This work 
provides that the fundamentals of Western society are reason in the Greek tradition, Roman or 
common law, and Christianity.71 These men show that all three of these pillars are essential for 
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upholding the western way of life, and are in no way in contention with one another.72 Relativism, 
though has caused these pillars to crumble, and the roots of Western society to dry up, by creating 
a tension that does not exist. While Rousseau would place much less emphasis upon Christian 
revelation than Pera or Ratzinger, as he thought that religious teachings were easily corrupted by 
scientific innovation or political abuse, religion is very capable of helping a society determine what 
is right and wrong. Christianity was able to add hope, faith, and charity to our lives, which provided 
a basis from which we can judge human behavior.73 In many ways, the contention between 
Rousseau and religion is no longer an issue as the church has not only largely avoided political 
abuse but has shown that science and revelation need not be in contention. In many ways, science 
and religion are irreducible, and religion can give deeper meaning to scientific innovation through 
the establishment of a philosophy for human life. However, such a foundation can only do so much 
in a world dominated by Value-Relativism.  
 Pera claims it is due to relativism, that one cannot judge between cultures, theories, 
conceptual universities, language games, and world views – as well as values, governments, and 
faiths.74 While relativism may seem beneficial on the outset, and has swept throughout the world 
under this illusion, this philosophy has many pitfalls, not least of which is the ability to shut down 
dialogue between individuals and nations. Among noticeable pitfalls is the inability of the West to 
claim that its culture is superior to that of some radical Middle Eastern cultures. This theory would 
suggest that “[i]f one believes the West is better than Islam,” for any reason, “then they ought to 
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object to it.”75 This assertion is impeded for two reasons. Firstly, the West does not believe that 
there are good reasons to say that it is better than Islam.76 Secondly, it believes that, if such a 
reason exists, it would have to fight Islam.77 Pera argues that there is good reason to think that the 
West is better than Islam – this can be contributed to the neo-fundamentalism of practitioners of 
Islam, Sharia law, or the welcoming attitude of the West towards Muslims that is not reciprocated 
when Christians go to Islamic countries.78 However, Pera asserts that while the West is superior, 
this does not necessarily mean that the two cultures must fight, and he suggests open dialogue as 
an alternative.79 Open dialogue, according to Pera, is a sufficient alternative to open warfare as 
long as Jihad is not declared on the Western way of life.80 However, one cannot foster such 
dialogue when value relativism remains the reigning world view.  
Pera asserts that “relativism has wreaked havoc, and it continues to act as a mirror and echo 
chamber for the dark mood that has fallen over the West.”81 It allows society to disregard fact in 
favor of unsupported opinion. It allows for the assertion that tyranny is just as good of a political 
system as is democracy – asserting that it is just a different political arrangement. History has 
shown us that this is not the case. It has shown us that some political arrangements in life are far 
superior to others, and that this claim can be supported by fact. As Pera notes, “relativism that 
preaches the equivalence of values or cultures is grounded not so much in tolerance as in 
acquiescence, more inclined toward capitalism than awareness, more focused on decline than on 
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the force of conviction, progress, and mission.”82 In a fruitful society, values and facts cannot be 
separated, as we must place greater significance on that which is supported by fact. Craig supports 
this argument, that value should be supported by fact, showing that the fact-value distinction is 
greatly misguided. In order to show that for values to exist they must have their foundation in fact, 
one must look no further than Craig’s prologue to The War Lover, which can be broken down as 
such: 
 
I. “‘Ought’ implies ‘can,’” and therefore, matters of fact must have implications for 
values.  
a. For the fact-value distinction to work, facts would have no implication for values – 
because it is implying that they are radically different.  
b. However, we know that standards of right and wrong, principles of justice and 
morality, are limited by what is psychologically and politically possible (fact).  
II. The natural order is not neutral with regards to “good” and “bad.”  
a. We tend toward the “good,” e.g. good health, of which there is great supporting 
evidence.  
b. Health is not simply a matter of the body, but the mind and soul as well.  
III. People tend to treat their own good as something objective and not subjective – as value 
separated from fact would be.  
a. Evidence of this lies in the fact that we treat some views as being better than others 
– which implies that there is something real and objective.  
i. Despite this, one’s actions are ultimately guided by opinion, although said 
opinion is closer to the truth than what would have been if objective choices 
were not made.  
IV. There are objective grounds for preferring certain character traits over others – as some 
character traits have nothing to recommend them.   
a. It is important to use inductive reasoning (synopsis). 
i. However, most people do not do this well, which is why people are always 
disagreeing on values, and thus necessitating that we constantly revise our 
judgments.  
ii. Therefore, it is impossible to know what should be valued, though one can 
gain a pretty good idea through reason.  
1. With the fact-value distinction, one has even greater limits on what 
can be known – if anything at all. With the fact-value distinction in 
place, one could mistake philosophy for the act of falling off a 
bicycle, as the very act of separating value from fact is a chimerical 
distinction.   
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V. Conclusion: The fact-value distinction is inherently flawed, and perhaps impossible 
with regards to application, as values do not exist – the word ‘value’ itself being no 
more than an “omnibus term for standards and principles, and even preferences and 
tastes,” once separated from fact. The fact-value distinction must be disregarded 
because values should be based on facts – not separated from them. However, what is 
fact may be hard to determine, which leaves room for disagreement. Yet, even so, use 
of the fact-value system allows one to reject the notion that life should be lived a certain 
way, and is therefore one of the greatest mistakes.83   
 
Craig shows that the judgements that we make about right and wrong should be rational 
and based upon fact.84 Though there is a ‘right’ and a ‘wrong,’ a ‘good’ and a ‘bad,’ it remains 
difficult for one to know in all circumstances what should be done. To determine this, we must 
employ reason to sort out the information as well as our own experiences; theories about what is 
right and what is wrong will arise when a hypothesis cannot be disproven.85 Often, what is right 
or wrong will fall on a spectrum, sometimes falling closer to ‘absolute bad’ or ‘wrong’ and 
sometimes closer to ‘absolute good’ or ‘right.’86 This is often called synthetic reasoning, which is 
a way of thought put forward as a viable alternative to Value-Relativism. The intention is that, by 
employing this practice, an ethics will develop ensuring that we treat others and ourselves with 
justice and morality.87 This way of inductive reasoning does not rid society of values, but ensures 
that the values that are held are based on a factual representation of the world rather than 
unsupported opinion. In this way, society can better employ the humanities to explore human 
nature and, where it is needed, place checks upon scientific development to ensure that it does not 
interfere with the sanctity of human life.  
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By arguing against the sciences and the arts, Rousseau removes many of the stumbling 
blocks man faces as he seeks a moral life. Rousseau shows that when men create new tools, such 
as has been done with scientific innovation, they “create new, derivative needs, needs that soon 
override the primary needs in their urgency.”88 This is Rousseau’s point whenever he invites the 
reader to consider whether men might not be better off without the power, faculties, or tools, that 
modern man has developed that allow him to do just as much ill as good. Rousseau holds that it 
was only with the progression of time and the development of societies and languages that man 
became aware of his own morality – and with this his ability to do bad and good. Possession of the 
knowledge to differentiate between the good and bad is more important than ever before, as man 
has the ability to do more with science than ever before in history – thus creating many more moral 
imperatives. Such imperatives may be so grave as the actions man takes in order to delay death or 
simply the slow alteration of what society deems to be the highest aim. Many societies post- 
Enlightenment allow for intelligence to be more highly praised than an individual’s virtue, failing 
to recognize that virtue may contribute more to the well-being of a society than an individual’s 
ability to create through their intellect.  
Throughout his Discourses, Rousseau shows that the sciences and the arts owe their birth 
to our vices, not our virtues. Misunderstanding of the sciences has led to a willingness to praise 
what is morally depraved. As Rousseau notes in his First Discourse, if the sciences and the arts 
were developed due to our morality, we would have less reason to question their possible 
advantages. Much of what scientific advancement has allowed us to do has fed the aspects of our 
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nature that are selfish and lazy, which has made it more difficult to be virtuous. Over time it has 
becomes harder to ignore these selfish tendencies. This is a vicious cycle, as the more we succumb 
to selfish tendencies the easier it gets to succumb again in the future.89 This can be seen in an 
example of an individual attempting to diet: it is much easier to resist the first cookie than it is the 
second or third.  
 In the Social Contract, Rousseau writes that while “man is born free, … everywhere he is 
in chains.”90 We have enslaved ourselves with our desires and the stigmas that are born out of civil 
society. In civil society, “[o]ne no longer dares to appear what one is.”91 Here, Rousseau is 
referring to the social custom that suggests that, if someone compliments you, you are obliged to 
follow suit and pay a compliment in return, even if you are not sincere. Rousseau argued that this 
practice made society artfully fake, as no one said what they truly meant or felt.92 Because of this, 
“[o]ne will thus never really know with whom one is dealing” and it will put an end to all “sincere 
friendships,” and all “real esteem.”93 This breeds “[s]uspicions, offenses, fears, coolness, reserve, 
hatred, [and] betrayal” within a society.94 
Many of the extravagances that we have come to take for granted over time have slowly 
degraded the morality of society. Such developments include even the development of letters, 
which has helped contribute to this decline. According to Rousseau, luxury is diametrically 
opposed to good morals. Rousseau’s position is partly due to his belief that all abuse of time is a 
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great evil. Additionally, historic societies that were not filled with luxuries were more likely to 
win wars, making them better able to protect and defend their way of life. The rise of luxuries has 
been shown to reduce the citizen’s willingness to protect their fatherland. Those individuals 
accustomed to luxury and leisure are not only less willing but less physically capable of fighting. 
These individuals also harbor a greater fear that warfare may cause them great harm as they are 
not accustomed to feeling want, hunger or thirst, fatigue, or harsh environments. Plato’s Glaucon 
is an example of how tastes can be corrupted with desire for luxuries. When the men in Plato’s 
Republic are defining the just city in speech, Glaucon asks what place ‘relishes’ would have in 
such a city. The consequent incorporation of the relishes completely changed the structure of 
Socrates’ city, and demonstrates, that human beings prefer finer things. Just as it was in the 
Republic, the addition of luxuries has complicated life, making it more difficult to live a pious or 
moral life. This can be seen within the religious community; often religious clerics will separate 
themselves from many worldly possessions to rid themselves of certain temptations that have the 
potential to corrupt morals.  Rousseau connects art to the decline of morals. To do so, Rousseau 
had to harken back to natural man within the State of Nature. As highlighted in Plato’s Republic, 
justice can only be found when there is injustice to compare it to.  
Science, despite innumerable benefits, raises many ethical dilemmas. Due to the moral 
neutrality of science, and the fact that it can be used for as many bad purposes as good, scientific 
innovation is potentially dangerous.95 Several of Rousseau’s works present the argument that 
human reliance upon the luxuries brought about by sciences and arts are responsible for the 
corruption that is rampant throughout our society. As Rousseau predicted, over time, science has 
                                             
95 George W. Bush in Yuval Levin, The Moral Challenge of Modern Science. (The New Atlantis: 
A Journal of Technology and Society. Fall 2006), 32-3. 
27 
 
eliminated any of the moral reasoning it once had – especially more traditional ways of moral 
reasoning.96  While, in his natural state, man was born uncorrupt and free of desire. The pursuit of 
that which would elevate man’s estate has led to his corruption, as science does not “encourage 
higher and more noble pursuits,” and is not subservient to any other field.97  
However, although man and society have been corrupted, humanity must think of a solution 
going forward. As any scientist will admit, the modern scientific principle – based upon systematic 
study, hypothesis, and independent testing – “simply gives us raw power”; it is up to those outside 
the field “to determine what is right or wrong.”98 The sciences have set in motion many ethical 
dilemmas that we cannot continue to ignore. Because of this, we can logically conclude that this 
task, of regulation and seeing to the nations morality, must fall to the humanities. The social 
humanities, which often delve into ethics, morality, justice, and the good life, would seem to have 
the necessary foundation to provide modern scientific innovation with a desperately needed moral 
compass.  
 
CAN THE SCIENTIFIC FIELD ANSWER THESE ETHICAL DILEMMAS – OR MUST IT TURN TO THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES?  
Scientific development is one of the pressing issues confronting society.99 Many of the 
scientific advancements that individuals have deemed to be an unequivocal good have not been 
properly evaluated from the standpoint of probity, which would now fall outside of the scientific 
field. Additionally, “questions about the fruits of science are typically directed to the way society 
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uses science rather than to the specific project itself.”100 As a society, we cannot continue to ignore 
these ethical dilemmas or the very foundations of modern science. As the ability of the sciences to 
do what it has previously been incapable of doing grows, “the more troubling and vexing these 
ethical questions become.”101 Due to the many ethical questions that are continually being raised, 
as well as the inability of the field itself to determine what is right or wrong, it is possible that 
science may need to be regulated from the outside, as it is not feasible to go back to a time without 
scientific innovation. Modern science has adopted the mentality that it is justified in refusing to 
explore what is ethical. This is because, while science “does not necessarily encourage higher and 
more noble pursuits,” it also does “not necessarily conflict with them.”102 Theoretically, “modern 
science can coexist with virtuous life;” but, because the sciences have the power to do anything, it 
is necessary that it be regulated in order to ensure that scientific innovation is limited to what it 
should do rather than simply what it is capable of doing.  
While modern science attracts the best and brightest, this field alone cannot provide the 
answers that we need. Practitioners within the modern social sciences strongly advocate that the 
sciences be regulated by the humanities, as they think that without their intervention modern 
ethical dilemmas will never be answered. The pairing of the arts and sciences seems to offer the 
perfect answer to the predicament that modern society faces, and could help alleviate the 
“widespread pessimism, fear, and conflict,” that has spread throughout the nation due to the 
inability of the sciences to answer ethical dilemmas.103 Through this pairing, politics can govern 
scientific practices that threaten to violate important moral boundaries, while separating itself from 
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any work that would “distort or hide unwelcome facts.”104 As “politics exists to govern action, … 
at times it must govern science.”105 Though this seems to be the perfect pairing, we must ask 
ourselves: why did the humanities not keep pace with the sciences throughout the Enlightenment?  
As well as, why do prominent scholars such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau argue that the humanities 
were insufficient to save us? Rousseau’s argument states that we, as a people, have moved too far 
away from morality, that the humanities have lost much of its credibility, and is just as incapable 
of promoting ethical decisions as is the sciences. Additionally, the humanities foster a type of 
individual capable of being insufferably stuck-up, more concerned with brandishing their wit and 
showing off than seriously considering what is best for mankind. The possibility of such stark 
realities, and facilitating faux philosophers, should cause us to question, like Rousseau, whether 
advanced society with such moral dilemmas is truly desirable. 
Because political intervention must capitulate to “[t]he preeminence of health” the sciences 
remain capable of regulating the overarching “goals of the scientific enterprise,” and stripping 
away power from any political enterprise which may seek to limit the capabilities of the sciences.  
In addition to stressing the preeminence of physical well-being, the sciences have “also limit[ed] 
the ability of politics to act in the service of other important goods,” such as mental or moral well-
being.106 Levin notes that “the authority we cede to science, both as the servant of health and as 
the master of knowledge, weakens our allegiance to those other sources of wisdom so crucial to 
our self-understanding and self-government.” As a society we have forgotten that it is “those other 
sources [that] serve to ground our moral judgment, while science avoids or flattens moral 
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questions, since it cannot answer them and rarely needs to ask them.”107 This issue is so ingrained 
that science is often thought of as above politics – untouchable “by moral premises, or tradition, 
or religious or personal views, as if every question of public policy with any scientific dimension 
must be understood as a matter of pure science alone.”108 As such, the humanities, as they are, 
would not be able to regulate the ethics of scientific innovation.  
Rousseau was one of the first individuals to recognize that modern scientific developments 
led to various ethical dilemmas and impeded the pursuit of happiness. It was because of this that 
he called for a rebirth of the salutary humanities. While modern society typically holds the 
humanities to be an “unquestionably nice endeavor,” Wilfred M. McClay, professor of history at 
the University of Tennessee, argues, along with Stanley Fish, author of Will the Humanities Save 
Us?, that the humanities do not do anything, “‘other than give pleasure to “those who enjoy 
them.’”109 McClay – like Rousseau, though perhaps not to the same extent – thinks that the 
humanities can be more of a burden than a blessing.110 Here the two men’s paths diverge, as 
McClay does not argue that society should get rid of the humanities in their entirety, but that the 
humanities should find their way back to the “first principles” – those of the ancients’ prior to the 
Enlightenment – as well as develop a deeper understanding of “humanistic content.”111 If the 
humanities are capable of accomplishing this, it is entirely possible that we could pursue 
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knowledge or philosophy simply to cultivate a deeper understanding of human nature, rather than 
to feed man’s amour proppre, or vanity.  
In line with Rousseau’s philosophy, McClay writes that there is a burden that comes along 
with the humanities. Rousseau’s work suggests that the burden that accompanies the practice of 
the humanities would be our perpetual unhappiness – the inability to happily live within such a 
complex society. For McClay this “can refer to the weight the humanities themselves have to bear, 
the things they are supposed to accomplish on behalf of us, our nation, or our civilization.”112 
Alternatively, the burden can refer to “the ways in which the humanities are a source of 
responsibility for us, and their recovery and cultivation and preservation our job, even our duty.”113 
Either way, McClay points out, “the humanities, rightly pursued and rightly ordered, can do things, 
and teach things, and preserve things, and illuminate things, which can be accomplished in no 
other way.”114 The humanities alone have recognized the “range and depth of human possibility, 
including our immense capacity for both goodness and depravity.”115 However, diverging from 
Rousseau, McClay notes that unlike the sciences, the humanities teach us to question what the 
“good life” is, and how we can achieve it. Even so, the idea that the humanities can guide scientific 
innovation is putting a lot of weight on the humanities – especially as modern society is so quick 
to dismiss this field. Such responsibility would require in-depth knowledge of several fields such 
as human psychology and political theory along with a basic knowledge of science including 
chemistry, molecular biology, and physics. Ultimately, while the humanities do have an important 
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use in our lives, this field is limited by the sheer amount of knowledge worldwide and the amount 
of time it takes to become proficient in each area.116  
Because “science is inherently progressive,” it “gives us the sense that all other means of 
understanding must strive to catch up.”117 However, this is not the case. The humanities needs 
simply to develop a moral framework capable of keeping the sciences, and perhaps even its own 
field, in check.118 The humanities, like the sciences, have not been left untouched by modern 
principles and Value-Relativism. This field has in many ways been crippled by the misguided 
ideals of modern society, which has left it damaged by modernity and forgetful of the teachings of 
the ancients. The Neo-Kantian reasoning that led to Value-Relativism has been so ingrained in 
modern social science that “it is almost invisible.”119 Because of this, the humanities have 
commanded less respect over time. Relativism and the fact-value distinction has contributed to the 
idea that the humanities are based on opinion and thus entirely subjective. As the humanities are 
considered “prescientific,” many do not consider the knowledge of this field to be valid, and 
modern society has wrongly dismissed the work of the humanities.120 However, while “the 
humanities are imprecise by their very nature,” it “does not mean that they are a form of intellectual 
finger painting.”121 For the most part, the humanities accurately reflect many of the subjects that 
fall underneath its umbrella by employing the same inductive logic that is employed by the 
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sciences. However, overtime modernity has in many ways led to a misunderstanding of basic 
human nature and a dismissal of the humanities, which the field has not been able to remedy.122 In 
instances such as this, we can see how parts of the humanities operate like, and have taken the 
same path as, the sciences.  
Craig states that modern science is an exploration of what “is” and how it works through 
investigation and classification.123 This separates science from how one comes to knowledge 
through reading, which can delve into the realm of what could potentially be.124 Reading is an 
investigation of what others have done and thought, which can allow us to gain access to what we 
want and what we love – not just what we know.125 Through reading, we can learn about the human 
soul. Because of this, truly magnificent writers do not simply write for their time, but, like science, 
are capable of transcending their time and culture. Plato’s Socrates is one such example. His 
writings were completed in Athens Greece from 469-399 BCE and are still the most commonly 
read philosophy today.126 Writers today do not write like this, and many of the readers are 
incapable of reading such literature. Craig asserts that as a society, we have forgotten how to 
read.127 Ancient writers were able to cultivate thought through careful meaning, so careful that 
everything within a work was significant – including the use of numbers through a practice known 
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as numerology.128 Work done by the humanities today is often devoid of mathematical reasoning, 
cumulative logic, and synthetic reasoning. 
The humanities of today would greatly benefit from synthetic reasoning, a method of 
inductive reasoning that was employed by the ancients. Synthetic reasoning has been put forward 
as a viable alternative to Value-Relativism.129 This method of conscious thought provides for the 
examination of specific cases to determine what they have in common.130 In fact, most scientific 
experimentation is done by employing synthetic reasoning. Reasoning through induction allows 
us to use evidence and reason and to ensure that facts and values are not separated while we 
determine what is right or wrong.131 Such a conscious thought process like synthetic reasoning 
ensures the rationality of human thought, but it also means that such a process must be perfected 
through education.132 Advanced education is necessary for synthetic reasoning because 
judgements of good and bad, right and wrong, noble and base, are not dependent upon mysterious 
values, but can be found through the application of one’s rational power and synthesis of evidence 
and experience.133 Such a foundation would be a necessary first step in reestablishing the 
legitimacy of the humanities. 
 
As a society, we have undergone what Levin has deemed a “moral forgetfulness,” as 
society has “overlook[ed] the importance of tradition” and cumulative thought.134 This 
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“forgetfulness has extended to science,” as it, like other fields, seems to have overlooked the fact 
that human knowledge regarding “tradition, education, religion, philosophy, and ethics” is most 
enlightening when the knowledge gleaned by our ancestors is not dismissed as irrelevant.135 It is 
such forgetfulness that gives weight to Rousseau’s statement that man understands much less about 
himself than he does about nature, as science simply tells us about nature – not specifically human 
nature. Because of this, while science has helped us to understand the physical world around us, 
we cannot understand the true nature of mankind in our own time. Those theories that were put 
forward by Socrates and Aristotle have, like the statue of Glaucus, eroded with the passage of 
time.136 While science “seems to offer a more advanced way to reason than the old approaches to 
all of our difficulties,” science itself was built from the knowledge of the ancients.137 Science was 
not born independently of all other knowledge, and it therefore cannot be the sole means of 
reasoning. Mankind would be foolish to continue in its attempt to replace all other means of 
reasoning with science alone. In fact, “the conventional understanding of modern science is 
contradicted on key points by contemporary evolutionary biology, behavioral ecology, 
neuroscience, mathematical physics and logic” in a way that the ancient way of thought never has 
been.138 This is because modern thought is predominantly viewed from a value-free understanding, 
which separates knowledge of the world from knowledge of human nature – leading to various 
flaws not only in the softer social sciences, but within the scientific field as a whole.  
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As the scientific field in the modern age has essentially perfected its ability to ignore moral 
imperatives, many would agree that “the governance of science is legitimate and necessary.” 139 
Man has “debas[ed] himself by pursuing “pure scientific advancement” alone.140 However, the 
humanities, in their current state, cannot offer insight into true human nature, as it is limited by 
relativism and a forgetfulness that has distorted what is known about human nature and morality. 
Because of this, a rebirth of the humanities is essential for the preservation of morality. Through 
this rebirth, the humanities must develop a better understanding of human nature – including 
whether morality is innate or if it must be taught – in order to ground moral judgement within 
modern society.  
 
IS MORALITY INNATE OR MUST IT BE TAUGHT?   
It is difficult to say with any certainty what, if any, abstract qualities are innate to man and 
what, if anything, must be done to cultivate these qualities. In his Second Discourse, Rousseau 
calls attention to two principles that he thinks are innate to natural man: self-preservation and a 
repugnance to see suffering. Beyond this, Rousseau suggests, the principles that are commonly 
(but erroneously) held to be innate or part of “natural law” are derived from the observation of 
nature. Rousseau also argued that if man were to stray too far from the noble savage and learn to 
philosophize, he would lose his ability to feel empathy. It is due to this reasoning that Rousseau 
praised ignorance and denounced scientific innovation and the arts, as he thought that their 
cultivation would prevent an individual from empathizing with fellow human beings. In direct 
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contention with Rousseau’s claim, Steven Pinker suggests that morality, even the ability to feel 
pity for another living being, is not innate but must be developed overtime. Pinker, in his study of 
why war has declined over time, suggests that true empathy did not manifest until the invention of 
the printing press, which allowed individuals to sympathize with others through literature. Pinker 
seems to suggest that correctly structured popular culture can guide morality and expand an 
individual’s ability to feel empathy. Rousseau himself thought that culture should be guided by 
philosophic understanding – although he retains his belief that philosophy is not for the masses, 
who must simply be guided by a correct understanding of virtue.  
Through the advancement of modern technology and human psychology we have come to 
know more about neuroanatomy – the structure of the human brain. This has given man insight 
into the nature versus nurture debate, showing that both play a significant role and cannot be 
separated. Although our knowledge remains limited, what we have learned shows that an 
individual is greatly influenced by nature and evolutionary principles – even education itself. 
Steven Pinker, in his work The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature seeks to show 
that neither the Blank Slate nor the concept of the Nobel Savage gives an accurate depiction of 
human psychology. Further, knowledge such as this, concerning what qualities are innate to man, 
may be able to help society determine what its role should be if it wishes for empathy to be 
cultivated within its citizenry. It must be determined whether empathy and morality can be guided 
by philosophic understanding, whether such cultivation is possible within a democratic republic, 
and whether such an understanding can reinforce the weakened foundation of the humanities. 
 
Pinker shows that although the idea of the Blank Slate had ascended and deeply embedded 
itself into modern intellectual life, it was a gross misrepresentation of human psychology. The 
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Blank Slate has chiefly been disproven with the study of neuroanatomy and more recent views of 
human nature and culture.141 The notion of a “Blank Slate” originated with John Locke in an effort 
to counter the notion of the divine right of kings, as it was supported by Robert Filmer, and the 
institution of slavery.142 The idea of the Blank Slate “asserts that any differences we see among 
race, ethnic groups, sexes, and individuals comes not from differences in their innate constitution 
but from differences in their experiences.”143 In refuting the Blank Slate, Pinker does not suggest 
that kings have claim to divine right or that slavery is a noble institution, but that we have claim 
to other faculties that can work in refutation of these erroneous social constructs. Those who 
subscribe to the Blank Slate doctrine conceptualize human psychology as something akin to Silly 
Putty.144 More than a juvenile comparison, this is an accurate description of a view previously held 
by prominent psychologists, as they thought the mind, like Silly Putty “can absorb the printed word 
and it can be molded into different shapes.”145 Pinker also works to disprove the eighteenth century 
Noble Savage doctrine held by Rousseau.146 Rousseau thought that when man was placed within 
nature he was at his best and in his most gentle state, and because the state of nature was the best 
state for mankind, each consequent step that has taken away from his most primitive state has been 
a step in the wrong direction, and has ultimately led to the “decrepitness [sic] of the species.”147  
These once commonly held views began to change in the 1950s due to modern technological 
advancements. It became  acceptable to acknowledge that “the mental world can be grounded in 
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the physical world by the concepts of information, computation, and feedback.”148 The field of 
neuroscience began to take off, and scientists discovered that while the “structure of the brain is 
similar, person to person,” that there were occasionally some anomalies.149 For instance, 
neuroscientists found that a certain region in the brain, the anterior hypothalamus, was shaped 
slightly different in men who identified as gay than it was in those who did not.150 During this 
time, scientists also developed a more complex understanding of evolutionary psychology, which 
lent support to the Darwinian notion of natural selection, which “simulates the engineering of the 
perfect part,” with the hopes of ultimately producing the perfect human being.151  
Evolutionary psychology is credited with debunking the doctrine of the Noble Savage. It is 
thought that “a thoroughly noble anything is an unlikely product of natural selection, because in 
the competition among genes for representation in the next generation, noble guys tend to finish 
last.”152 This is especially true as “conflicts of interest are ubiquitous among living things, since 
two animals cannot eat the same fish or monopolize the same mate.”153 It is with this understanding 
that we can conclude that even if natural man had unlimited resources for a time, this would not 
have lasted for any significant period, perhaps not even extending to the development of languages. 
Even so, “the noble savage … is a cherished doctrine among critics of the sciences of human 
nature.”154 Social scientists like Stephen Jay Gould have tried to show that “Homo Sapiens is not 
an evil or destructive species,” even after the development of society. Gould formulated his 
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argument around “what he calls the Great Asymmetry” and the argument that “good and kind 
people outnumber all the others by thousands to one.”155 He additionally notes that “we perform 
10,000 acts of small and unrecorded kindness for each surprisingly rare, but sadly balancing, 
moment of cruelty.”156 This argument, is most likely an idealized version of human nature, and 
remains unsupported by history and anthropology – especially those commonly agreed upon 
aspects of evolution. Pinker shows that certain traits – such as favoring oneself or one’s offspring 
over others – are common to human psychology. What he has shown, while it has little to say 
regarding whether pity is innate, is insightful. Gould’s theory is, in many ways, in direct 
contradiction of Rousseau’s philosophy which states that the Noble Savage is man’s best form, as 
man, regardless of his place in time, is focused on monopolizing finite resources.  
 
Rousseau, in his doctrine of the Noble Savage asserted that while individuals are naturally 
good they have been corrupted by reason and desire – which led to the formation of languages and 
society. Rousseau asserts that pity, along with wanting to avoid feeling pain (self-preservation), 
are innate principles for mankind. Man’s other abilities, including his ability to reason and 
understand the difference between virtue and vice, were developed later.157 It was the development 
of these additional faculties that has corrupted natural man. Prior to the development of reason 
Rousseau’s Noble Savage was tender hearted. It was with the development of reason that man 
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found himself able to ignore the pain and suffering of others if he himself was safe.158 Rousseau 
notes:  
“Only dangers that threaten the entire society still disturb the philosopher’s 
tranquil slumber, and rouse him from his bed. One of his kind can with 
impunity be murdered beneath his window; he only has to put his hands 
over his ears and to argue with himself a little in order to prevent Nature, 
which rebels within him, from letting him identify with the man being 
assassinated.”159  
 
It was his capacity to feel pity that moved the Noble Savage “to do good.”160 The Noble 
Savage did not need a maximum such as: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,” 
as the Noble Savage knew with his natural goodness what was right and wrong.161 The notion of 
virtue did not even exist prior to the development of reason.162 However, with the development of 
the ability to reason man began to lose that which was once innate, the ability to feel pity and a 
repugnance to see suffering in other living beings. The type of self-preservation that Rousseau 
claimed was innate within savage man was amour de soi. Amour de soi manifests itself as a natural 
and healthy love of one’s self. Combined with reason and our awareness that others are conscious 
of us can fuel an individual’s self-esteem, turning anour de soi into amour propre.163 It is a desire 
for others to love and care for you – so you, in turn can know how to love and care for yourself. 
This self-love is not destructive at its roots, but can quickly lead there, because it is an impossible 
demand, as others will always love themselves more. Remaining unfulfilled, amour propre can 
lead to anger, pride, vanity, resentment, revenge, jealousy, indignation, competition, slavishness, 
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humility, capriciousness, rebelliousness, ect.164 It is a short step from healthy pride to burning 
narcissism. Man’s inability to make the world bend to his proud conception of himself, as fueled 
by his amour propre, not only leads him to conflict with other over-proud and ambitious men; it 
also keeps him outside himself, living through the opinion of others, and therefore incapable of 
the kind of tranquil contentedness that was available to the noble savage.165  
Steven Pinker holds a contrary view, which he details in his work The Better Angels of Our 
Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. Pinker argues that there is some evidence to suggest that the 
capacity to feel pity must be learned – that it is not an innate feeling which is automatically known 
to natural man. With this work, Pinker shows that over time society has become more docile. The 
Humanitarian Revolution, which began in the eighteenth century, contributed to the rise of 
empathy and a higher regard for human life. Unlike Rousseau, Pinker thinks that the “human 
capacity for compassion is not a reflex that is triggered automatically by another living thing,” but 
is a trait that must be learned.166 Because of this, Pinker is a great proponent of the Enlightenment, 
as his research has supported that as people become more intelligent they are more peaceable. 
While there was a period of violence that followed the Enlightenment – the French Revolution and 
the Napoleonic Wars – there is little reason to believe that the two were correlated.167 In fact, 
Pinker notes, the American Revolution, which followed the Enlightenment script much more 
closely than did the French Revolution, gave birth to a liberal democracy that has lasted for more 
than two centuries.168  
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The Enlightenment, which spurred the dissemination of knowledge throughout the Western 
World, greatly increased an individual’s quality of life. One plausible hypotheses for the decline 
in violence is that an individual’s capacity for empathy expanded as books became readily 
accessible. This increased the number of individuals with the ability to read and those who were 
able to develop the capacity to put themselves in another’s perspective.169 The advent of the 
Gutenberg Press, which led to an increase in the number of books available to be circulated, a 
consequent increase in the number of libraries, and an increase in the overall literacy rate of the 
population, is found to correspond with the decrease in violence. This correlation gives weight to 
Pinker’s hypothesis – that higher intelligence has improved morality and an individual’s capacity 
to emphasize with others.170 Another plausible theory is that humans were easier to dehumanize 
when they were dirty and unkempt, and that this became more difficult as their etiquette and 
hygiene improved.171 This theory is just as likely, and can be supported by many personal 
experiences today – though on a far lesser scale – as we find it is essential to look nice for a job 
interview and at other times when we want certain goods or services. There is one final theory that 
runs along these lines – that it is possible that human beings became more compassionate as their 
own lives improved and as they were living longer and in greater comfort.172 Each of these theories 
could have worked alone or in tandem to begin the humanitarian revolution and the significant 
decline in violence; however, it is important to remember that none of this would have been 
possible without the Enlightenment.  
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There are those who would argue that, like the philosopher Rousseau wrote of, today’s man 
can tune out the violence from around the world as long as it does not directly impact his quality 
of life. Pinker is not blind to this phenomenon, but disagrees with Rousseau’s reasoning. Pinker 
notes that mankind is simply incapable of processing the extent of destruction that modern 
technology has allowed for and all that modern media disseminates. Pinker highlights this inability 
by noting that when an individual dies, it is viewed as a tragedy –  yet, if a thousand individuals 
die, it is viewed as a statistic. Most individuals simply cannot wrap their head’s around such 
atrocities. Modern man has difficulty empathizing when it comes to large scale atrocities or when 
very little personal information is known about the individual or individuals who are suffering. 
This does not debunk Pinker’s claim though, as modern man remains capable of empathy. In fact, 
it is possible that modern man must empathize with more individuals now than ever before. He is 
told of atrocities that have occurred world-wide, not simply those that are limited to a certain 
province. In these cases, it may be more difficult to emphasize as these individuals are often not 
linked by culture, religion, or geography.  
Pinker’s theory, that people must learn how to be compassionate and that this ability can 
be improved with time, is also supported by Kant who, like Hobbes, thought that peace had to be 
established – leaving war, not peace, the “natural” state for mankind.173 Kant however, was very 
optimistic, and in his work laid out conditions for perpetual peace: a republican state, a league of 
nations that had a third party to adjudicate disputes, as well as universal hospitality and world 
citizenship.174 Today, while wars have become less frequent than they were previously, there is no 
doubt that they have become more damaging. A consequence of scientific development that cannot 
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be ignored. However, Kant’s theory of perpetual peace is not left unsupported, especially with the 
spread of democracy, the expansion of commerce and trade, and international organizations that 
are working together.175 Pinker notes that “for all its limitations, human nature includes [a] 
recursive, open ended, combinatorial system for reasoning, which can take cognizance of its own 
limitations.”176 As such, we can hardly envision a world without war – and most international law 
is based on the theory of realism. Though this may be the case, “the engine of the Enlightenment” 
both humanism and rationality, “can never be refuted by some flaw or error in the reasoning of the 
people in a given era.”177 In some ways, this statement by Pinker is a refutation of cultural and 
historical relativism – and even modern thought.  
 
It is difficult to know for certain if pity is an innate part of man’s constitution or if it is 
cultivated by culture and experiences. It has been argued that pity is a natural feeling which is 
supported by the early development of medicines; that, man would not have expended the effort 
to develop medicine if he did not feel pity for those who were suffering. However, this argument 
is deeply flawed. First, man only began to develop medicines after his natural constitution had 
already been corrupted. The other reason that this argument is flawed is because it is possible that 
medicine was developed for man’s own desire for self-preservation rather than the desire to prevent 
suffering in others. Additionally, because medicine developed in tandem with the ability to reason, 
man was also cultivating the means to contemplate abstract notions such as death. An 
understanding of death altered the overarching goal of medicine, and this art was not only practiced 
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for the prevention pain of but in order to cheat death. Such a realization made it possible for fear 
of death to replace pity for others. It is with small steps such as this that we have, in the past several 
centuries, developed such ethical questions that we would not have to answer if it were not for the 
progression of science. Additionally, the art of medicine was originally practiced in order to treat 
physical ailments, not to delve deeper into man’s psyche. As such, the scientific interpretation of 
what would make man happy has been interpreted to mean no more than the alleviation of physical 
pain, leaving unexplored that which would suit his character. Erroneous conceptions such as this 
have contributed to the general misunderstanding of the true nature of mankind and has led to a 
general confusion concerning the governance of science and society in general.  
 
WHERE DOES SOCIETY’S GUIDANCE COME FROM?  
Regardless of whether they are right or wrong, “our theories on human nature shape how 
we live our lives.” These theories help us to formulate our viewpoints regarding “violence, gender, 
childrearing and the arts.”178 It is, therefore, essential for mankind to develop theories that are not 
just plausible but based upon factual observation. These theories shape every aspect of our lives, 
from our thought process to how our society should conduct scientific innovation. In the West, our 
theories have either relied on reason or revelation, with each examining what is most fundamental 
to the world. With proper cultivation, it is possible that reason and revelation can, as part of the 
humanities, provide the necessary supports for moral judgement and assessments of right and 
wrong and thus serve as a guide for the sciences.  
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Religion can serve as a guide for individuals, and in many ways, would work in tandem 
with Rousseau’s philosophy, since many religions are not based upon the cultivation of knowledge 
but upon belief simply. In this way, religion would just be a standard to help a society judge 
between right and wrong through a basis of hope, faith, and charity. Additionally, religion provides 
a grounding that cannot be found elsewhere in society. Above all, religion provides “theories on 
human nature” and ensures that morality plays a part in how we shape our lives.179 Christianity is 
one of the few theories on human life that can provide a “synthesis of reason, faith, and life.”180 It 
has been found, through the American experiment, that religious belief can work in tandem with 
secular governmental institutions, although this seemingly works best when the religious tradition 
has its origin in Christianity.181 182 However, though religion remains a logical guide for society, 
it may simply be the easy answer. As seen in his letter to Beaumont, Rousseau is disparaging of 
certain aspects of Christianity. However, although Rousseau was critical of religious doctrine, he 
encouraged religious belief. Additionally, Rousseau thought that certain components of religion 
were essential for good society, especially love and morality. Religion would be able to put a check 
on modern science as it stresses human rights and dignities, thus pulling into question many 
procedures concerning the human body and soul including human cloning, organ harvesting, and 
abortion among other things. While Rousseau does not recommend that we turn to religion for 
guidance, it may be necessary to go beyond Rousseau’s philosophy when it comes to revelation. 
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Revelation is a key pillar of Western society, it can help support a moral society and in turn, lead 
to happiness and strength of feeling, as well as lend support to secular teachings.  
As Pera and Ratzinger have noted, while Christianity and the Enlightenment have been 
considered mutually exclusive, the effects of the Enlightenment have hit Christian thought 
particularly hard. Today’s society has been critical of many religious principles, and it has become 
more difficult for religious doctrine to convincingly synthesize all aspects of reason, faith, and 
life.183 Much of this comes down to the tenets of relativism. It is because of this, that religion, a 
component of the humanities, has been incapable of cultivating and maintaining morality within 
the citizenry and has, in many cases, lost ground to the sciences. As part of the humanities, 
Christianity must be lent support. It is possible that both good governance based upon promoting 
virtue and the promotion of a virtuous education could be the support that is needed in this 
endeavor. This is not to say that there are not road blocks to such a suggestion. Not only has Value-
Relativism stripped much of the meaning away from politics and education, but Rousseau has been 
as, if not more, critical of advanced education as he was of religion. 
Politics, when done correctly and either acting alone or in tandem with Christianity, could 
serve as a logical guide for society. Political life currently holds a great deal of power especially 
when juxtaposed with Christianity. Politics can potentially govern scientific practices that threaten 
to violate important moral boundaries, but it must ensure that it does not go too far and “distort or 
hide unwelcomed facts.”184 This is a logical solution as “[p]olitics exists to govern action, and so 
at times it must govern science.”185 While many would agree that “the governance of science is 
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legitimate and necessary,” one must recognize how difficult this would be in practice, as it would 
essentially negate the development of specialization.186 Politicians would have to become as well 
versed in science as they are in governmental theory. Even so, this would still leave room for 
conflict – especially within a liberal democracy if politicians were to place morality over the health 
and safety of the citizens.187 This is not because morality is not currently – or cannot eventually be 
– highly valued, but because the benefits of a moral citizenry are much less tangible than the 
benefits of the physical health and safety of the population. Another barrier to such a suggestion 
is that science is often thought to hold a preeminent place over politics, and is perhaps more highly 
valued than “liberal-democratic self-government.”188 We have seen that this is a dangerous 
arrangement, as scientific innovation remains untouched by “moral premises, or tradition, or 
religious or personal views, as if every question of public policy with any scientific dimension 
must be understood as a matter of pure science alone.”189 Education based upon synthetic thought, 
with the goal of promoting better political and religious virtue as part of the humanities, would be 
the logical solution for ensuring that morality is not ignored and discarded with the continuation 
of unregulated scientific innovation.  
 
Many societies would agree with Pinker, rather than Rousseau, that morality and the ability 
to empathize with others is increased, rather than decreased, with education. While perhaps less 
obvious today than ever before, many societies, both past and present, have been built upon the 
assumption that morality comes from a well-rounded education. This assumption is especially 
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evident when looking at early America, and the emphasis that each of the several states placed 
upon education. Early in American history it was commonly agreed that morality and education 
went hand-in-hand, and that one would foster the other. Education was thought to be especially 
necessary, because the founding fathers did not believe that man was naturally good, but naturally 
selfish, vain, and stupid. Because of this, a proper education was highly valued as it was a 
necessary precursor for the moral development of the citizenry – and thus good government. 
Because education was originally thought to be so important, states, localities, and communities 
were encouraged to center their governments around the cultivation of education and morality in 
citizens from an early age. Because the founding fathers recognized that the states could more 
easily cultivate citizen morality, this task fell to the states and not the federal government. This is 
because the states were close to the people and had a vested interest in their good behavior, nor 
were they restrained by the Bill of Rights as the federal government was at the time. This 
responsibility allowed the states to cultivate morality not only through higher education, but 
though religion as well. Often, religion, even more than education, provides greater substantiation 
to morality, which helps to cultivate upstanding citizens. Over time the United States has moved 
away from this reasoning, as the federal government has become increasingly involved in the 
educational process. Federal regulation has taken much of what was taught regarding religious 
virtue out of American school systems and has even lessened the importance of education within 
the American tradition.  Throughout this process, the education that is so necessary for cultivating 
a good and just citizenry has been transformed into a one size fits all policy focused upon science 
and math rather than the cultivation of morality.    
Although the United States has embarked on such a path, it does not mean that the 
cultivation of morality is less important today than it was in the early 1800s. In many ways the 
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decline of morality can be attributed to this separation. The psychologist Jonathan Haidt “has 
underscored the ineffability of moral norms in a phenomenon he calls moral dumbfounding,” 
which has taken hold of the common man.190 Haidt stated that “[o]ften people have an instant 
intuition that an action is immoral, and then struggle, often unsuccessfully, to come up with reasons 
why it is immoral.”191 In an experiment conducted by Lawrence Kohlberg, where an individual 
“must break into a drugstore to steal an overpriced drug that will save his dying wife,” they found 
that people could “muster no better justification for their answers than that [the individual] 
shouldn’t steal the drug because stealing is bad and illegal and he is not a criminal,” or that the 
individual “should steal the drug because that’s what a good husband does.”192  Pinker points out 
that it is rare that “people can articulate a principled justification, such as that human life is a 
cardinal value that trumps social norms, social stability, or obedience to the law.”193 Moral 
dumbfounding has taken a hold of society as a result of the Enlightenment. This movement stripped 
the humanities, and thus reason and revelation, of its influence within society; therefore, 
preventing the humanities from making moral judgements and deferring this knowledge, allowing 
science to develop unchecked and ensuring that modern society is incapable of correctly answering 
questions concerning morality without deferring to Value-Relativism. Because synthetic reasoning 
is dependent upon higher education we cannot dismiss education as an unessential aspect of 
modern day civilization. Correct judgements of what is good or bad, right or wrong, noble or base, 
cannot remain dependent upon mysterious values, but must be found through the application of 
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one’s rational power and synthesizing of evidence and experience.194 This, and thus morality, must 
be taught. The ancients knew this, as did the early Americans. Additionally, this falls in line with 
the first of the two possibilities Rousseau recommends for society going forward: that we seek to 
understand the true nature of virtue, and once we come to an understanding, we collectively, learn 
to practice virtue.195  
Rousseau saw religious education to be an acceptable alternative to the typical scientific 
education that an individual could receive, as it stressed morality and virtue over scientific 
advancements, which would lead to vanity and lay the seeds of discord within a society. Rousseau 
did not feel strongly about which religion was practiced, as he regarded morality as more important 
than any religious creed. In many ways, religious education, which would lead to morality, was 
the most important aim of the several states. Early American states valued morality as this would 
cultivate good citizens and thus good government. Because states had a vested interest in the 
morality of their citizens, Christianity was stressed in tandem with their educational programs. It 
is for these same reasons that Rousseau stressed morality in the citizen body.  
Higher education based upon synthetic reasoning is essential for modern society. Such 
education would detail ethics, morality, and what is necessary to remain virtuous in a society that 
often falls toward corruption. Although education, which remains unbiased towards revelation, 
Greek philosophy, and Roman law, could save modern society, it is essential to be cognizant of 
the several warnings throughout Rousseau’s teachings – especially his warning that education can 
be pernicious to human happiness. While modern society views higher education to be a lofty aim, 
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Rousseau is weary of the possible negative effects of education. In his First Discourse, Rousseau 
tells us that education is not for everyone, indeed, it is not for most. In his Second Discourse, 
Rousseau notes that although the ability to reason is often taken for granted in society as an 
unequivocal good this is a flawed assumption. 
 
ARE THE ARTS AND SCIENCES PERNICIOUS TO HUMAN HAPPINESS?   
To determine whether the sciences and the arts are pernicious to human happiness, it is 
essential to first determine how science and the arts relate to society and what man’s highest aim 
is. As was touched on previously, Rousseau does not think that there is a higher aim for man. By 
simply living a moral life man can achieve happiness, and is therefore doing what is best. Man 
only entered into civil society because he was ignorant of his own nature. It was due to this 
ignorance that he has effectively enslaved himself, making happiness much more difficult to 
obtain. Rousseau claims that true happiness can only be found within a civil society if virtue is 
better understood and taught. Other philosophers and scientists at the launch of the Enlightenment 
seem to think that there is in fact a higher aim for man – they simply cannot agree upon what it is. 
To Descartes, this end was “the advancement of health,” through scientific innovation.196 For 
Hobbes, the primary good was the “relief from the constant threat of death,” which could be found 
in civil society, and for John Locke it was “avoiding violence and protecting life,” by cultivating 
a deeper understanding of the natural order.197 Levin notes that “if health and power over nature 
are the highest human goods, then surely science (as opposed to politics) must be the primary 
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instrument of our fulfillment.”198 This is because science, far more than politics, aims towards 
advancing mankind’s control over natural phenomenon. This would support Descartes’ conception 
of man’s highest aim. Modern civil society has single-mindedly pursued the relief of man’s estate, 
at the expense of political, religious, and philosophical aims. According to Rousseau, it is this 
pursuit that has corrupted rather than purified morals, making man miserable rather than content 
with his own lot. 
Many of today’s “scientific explanations of the world often seem unrelated to the concerns 
of the average citizen.”199 Day-to-day life is in many ways devoid of scientific explanation, even 
though we are unceasingly reliant on its fruits. Practitioners of modern science do not know how 
to best apply the raw power they have harnessed. They seek to improve the natural state of man 
without stopping to inquire whether we are on the correct path.200 If we pause to examine modern 
life, we can see how our current trajectory has led to the fulfillment of certain aspects of Rousseau’s 
assertions – in part, that modern civil society is an impediment to happiness. Much of this conflict 
has arisen from man’s inability to understand his true nature, the essential link between morality 
and happiness, and man’s inability to reach perfection. Failure to understand this has allowed man 
to unilaterally pursue scientific development at the determent of Roman law, Greek philosophy, 
and Christianity. While modern science has greatly improved the physical aspects of our life, man 
is left feeling unfulfilled. While science itself is not immoral, it must be reminded of its original 
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purpose – which was not to be all-encompassing, but to contribute to the relief of man’s estate 
while remaining mindful of what is morally good.201 Levin noted: 
 
“The problem is not that our inventions might be used for both good and 
evil purposes, but that we denizens [sic] of the scientific age are at risk of 
becoming unable to distinguish between good and evil purposes. Moral 
imperatives, including especially those profound moral imperatives at the 
root of the scientific enterprise, are becoming clouded over just as the 
scientific enterprise begins to focus its attention most directly on the human 
animal itself.”202  
 
It is due to the unfocused nature of science as well as an insufficient understanding of the 
true nature of humanity that Rousseau argues modern science has made society discontent. Such a 
development was initiated with the spread of the arts and sciences throughout the Enlightenment, 
but has come to a head in modern society as there are more and more developments that are directly 
impacting man both physically and spiritually. Because of this, it is essential to examine if the arts 
and sciences in their most basic state are pernicious to modern man or if it is simply the use of 
science without a check that is pernicious to man.  
We have seen, through the examination of the modern scientific project and Value-
Relativism, how easy it is to misstep and how difficult it is to go back. Morality and human 
happiness are no longer the goal of modern society, and it seems as if the nation is in a downward 
spiral. Our love of philosophy led to the adoption of Value-Relativism, as we followed, or perhaps 
misinterpreted the philosophy of Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Kant. Additionally, employing 
education as a check on society has been problematic for two reasons: people are fearful of what 
they do not know and they are intellectually lazy. In many ways, this is comparable to the reasons 
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why the Christian faith has been struggling – as individuals believe that Christianity either puts 
too many restrictions upon life, or, erroneously state that due to the inventions of modern science, 
it is out of step with the modern era.203 As such, one must consider if the sciences and the arts truly 
are pernicious to human happiness and goodness. 
Today, though the advancement of evolutionary principles, we can see evidence that the 
doctrine of the Noble Savage should be dismissed as a fallacy. Therefore, the potential for 
happiness should be just as great now as it was then. However, it is possible that the setup of certain 
societies can greatly reduce or improve the likelihood of happiness. One must inquire whether the 
ancient’s philosophy and the systematic inquiry of natural phenomenon, held in check by Reason 
and Revelation, could in fact foster human happiness and goodness within a civil society in a way 
that is superior to our current society.  
 
Rousseau claims that education stems from our vices and that there are very few people 
who can learn without selfish motives. It is therefore better to be ignorant, as an ignorant individual 
can more easily find happiness, even within civil society. While many individuals can aspire to 
this lofty aim, of being both learned and happy, only a few will succeed. Such stark realities shake 
our confidence in the desirability of learning and philosophy as a way of human life – as true 
knowledge may not be possible for most people. Rousseau’s claim cannot be dismissed out of 
hand as his philosophy finds parallels within everyday life. Many creative geniuses struggle with 
depression, as their desire to reach perfection often surpasses their talent or human ability. Such a 
desire has in many ways been the defeat of man. It was this desire for perfection that permanently 
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altered natural man. Scientific innovation was begun because what was once “fine” or “good” no 
longer sufficed after our sights were set upon the concept of perfection. However, despite the leaps 
and bounds that are made with the invention of new technologies, man is unable to satiate his 
passions, and new innovations remain “fine” or “good,” as the human condition prevents us from 
obtaining perfection. This is a cyclical issue that is never abating, thus ensuring that man can never 
be happy. Man has also found himself discontented by his mistaken conviction, which has 
subconsciously been adopted in modern society, that he is a god capable of controlling nature. 
Believing oneself a god that is unable to reach perfection is likely to cause its fair share of anxieties.  
Reason was cultivated because we desired more. More control over nature, more years of 
life, more luxuries. Rousseau states that “[w]e seek to know only because we desire to enjoy, and 
it is not possible to conceive why someone who had neither desires or fears would take the trouble 
to reason.”204 This capacity to reason has developed overtime. “The Passions owe their origin to 
our needs, and their progress to our knowledge; for one can only desire or fear things in terms of 
the ideas one can have of them, or by the simple impulsion of Nature.”205 It is through the 
cultivation of our desire that we developed the capacity to desire more. Savage man, “deprived of 
every sort of enlightenment,” could only conceive of desires which would meet and not “exceed 
his physical needs.”206 The Noble Savage knew only to desire universal goods, “food, a female, 
and rest; the only evils he fears are pain, and hunger.”207  
While our entire way of life is built on the idea that learning leads to enrichment, Rousseau 
argues that this is not the case, at least not initially or for most people. Our advanced society has 
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made man miserable, discontented with his lot in life, and unable to find happiness within himself. 
Civil society has only shown that humanity is vain and self-serving. Rousseau’s own example, that 
he is fond of learning, shows that not everyone is capable of retaining their morality and 
simultaneously be fond of learning. Rousseau was a learned man, but he was miserable and 
paranoid. He was distrustful of his friends and unable to keep close acquaintances for any extended 
period. He confesses that he would have been much happier if he had not devoted his time to study. 
Like many other philosophers, Rousseau acknowledged that not everyone has the same 
intelligence level, or can adequately deal with philosophic information. Like Plato, Rousseau knew 
that not everyone was born to philosophize. This is seen in the Allegory of the Cave and in the life 
of Emile, as well as within Rousseau’s other philosophical writings.   
Rousseau’s Emile show’s an in-depth view of education, and how even with dedication it 
may not be the right path for everyone. Rousseau’s novel Emile was about the education and 
maturation of a young boy. At the pinnacle of Emile’s education he was given several tests in order 
to determine if he had what it takes to be a philosopher. These tests show that Emile, like the great 
majority of the individuals within society, was not meant to be a philosopher. Because of this, the 
teacher shows him his new life’s meaning – to love a woman named Sophia. To Emile, this one 
woman is the embodiment of philosophy, and with that his needs in life are satisfied. This novel 
supports Rousseau’s claim that not everyone, or even most people, can be cutout to practice 
philosophy. It is because of this that Rousseau criticizes Socrates for making philosophy seem too 
appealing to the masses. Plato’s Socrates made philosophy so appealing that individuals who were 
not capable of philosophizing were inspired to become philosophers. It was those individuals who 
tried to live a philosophic life, but were incapable of doing so, like Thrasymachus, who led to the 
tarnishing of the field. Rousseau sought to show the dark underbelly of philosophy in order to 
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make it sound unappealing to those who should not practice it. Individuals who are not capable of 
philosophizing should not strive for an end that can never be attained, as that would lead to 
unhappiness as their desire would outstrip their ability to fulfill. Happiness is being able to fulfill 
one’s desires.     
Because Rousseau valued education, but thought himself incapable of practicing 
philosophy without becoming morally corrupt and miserable, he considered himself a useless 
member of society. Throughout his life, Rousseau remained unhappy. He lost many of his friends 
and was in a loveless relationship with the woman he eventually married. It was because he never 
found happiness that he argues he was not an individual capable of pursuing education. This was 
not surprising to him, as he thought that “Science is not compatible with the virtue of ‘the peoples’; 
rather, it is compatible with the virtue of certain individuals.”208 As intelligent as Rousseau was, 
he had many difficulties that he has attributed to his knowledge and to vanity. He cautions others 
against this, as he does not think that this is a worthy trade off. Not only did Rousseau think that 
he would be better off if he had neglected study and looked after his morality, he also believes that 
this is the case for society. A society would be better off and happier if it looked towards its own 
morality, rather than to the advancement of the sciences.  
The sciences, in their current form, can only help man understand his physical surroundings 
and his physical being – not his true nature. The philosophy that Rousseau recommends can be 
seen as a different type of science, one which centers on human happiness and morality. It is 
because of this that Rousseau can permit that some individuals become learned, as their practice 
is not seen as putting their morality in jeopardy. Only a few individuals can do this, Rousseau 
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himself claiming that he was not capable of this feat. Among those people Rousseau asserts could 
become learned are Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, and Isaac Newton. Rousseau limited the 
exception to these three individuals as he thought that they alone could pursue philosophy without 
compromising their morality. Rousseau makes the argument that such an ability, to learn without 
corruption, is exceedingly rare, and because of this, it is better for the majority of the population 
to never learn. Failing to realize this would give them great ambitions they are unable to meet, and 
feed their amour propre, making it more likely that they would give in to all their vices and never 
be truly happy. It is not uncommon for individuals to seek to become learned so that they will be 
valued more highly by society and their peers.  In this sense, education furthers vanity –  as it is 
human pride that pushes them to learn. To be moral, one may want to avoid science.  
Education in the sciences and the arts have allowed for a dishonest society, making it easier 
for individuals to hide whether they are virtuous. While the arts and the sciences have not 
contributed to an increase or decrease in the number of individuals who are virtuous, they have 
made it easier to deceive and be deceived. This ability has collectively compromised society’s 
principles, making it customary to say and do what one does not believe.209 If someone 
compliments you, it is customary to follow suit, even if you do not mean what you say. This is 
where the arts have gotten society. Rousseau asserts that knowing who is and is not virtuous would 
spare individuals a great deal of pain. An examination of Rousseau’s life depicts many ways in 
which insincerity and vanity caused him pain that he otherwise may not have had to contend with.  
This is seen especially in regards to his relationship with the Baron von Grimm, though also with 
Denis Diderot and Madame d’Épinay. The arts have ensured that there are no longer sincere 
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friendships, as propriety has prevented individuals from truly coming to know each other.210 To 
some extent, this is dependent upon the society and the times, as some conceal more or less 
depending upon what is fashionable at the time. The development of reason unleashed true human 
selfishness and vanity. While it is often difficult to judge the morals of a society, Rousseau asserts 
that there is a direct correlation between a society’s morality and the development of the sciences 
and the arts. As a society’s sciences and arts have advanced unchecked so has the corruption of 
society’s morality.  
To highlight the connection between art and vanity, Rousseau quotes Socrates, who said 
that the poets and the artists know nothing, though they all pretend to know something. 
 
“We do not know, neither the Sophists nor the Poets, nor the 
Orators, nor the Artist, nor I, what is the true, the good, and the 
beautiful: But there is this difference between us that, although 
these people know nothing, they all believe they know something:  
Whereas I, while I know nothing, am at least not in any doubt 
about it.”211  
 
Today’s intellectuals must remain humble. It is better to assert you know nothing, than to 
boldly proclaim that you are learned, though you do not understand the world, as “The less one 
knows, the more one believes oneself to know.”212 It is with this understanding that Rousseau 
claims that Socrates would distain our vain sciences. Arts and sciences can corrupt and make 
people lazy – there are very few goods that come from this.  
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However, Rousseau also recognized that happiness and one’s capability of obtaining 
happiness changes over time. Happiness reflects one’s mental capabilities, or the ability to fulfill 
your desires. It is important to remember that Rousseau himself asserts that seeking higher 
intelligence is a noble aim if it does not compromise morality or happiness. If one is not careful, 
reason will act as the source of our unhappiness. Rousseau’s rejection of science is only absolute 
with regards to the common man. The conception of science is superior to society, as scientific 
principles will exist regardless of whether society is around.  The faults that Rousseau found with 
the Enlightenment is that it did not pursue science in the correct manner, and although philosophy 
once fought against prejudices, it has become the purveyor of such prejudices. Not everyone is 
able to expand their capability to reason and retain their morality. Rousseau uses his own life 
experiences to demonstrate this. Rousseau holds a high opinion of his capabilities, and rightly so. 
He was a learned man who’s writing has withstood the test of time and is still analyzed today.  
 
The sciences, although much advanced since Rousseau’s writings, have remained 
structured in much the same way. They remain aloof to questions concerning morality and are 
unregulated by social constructs. As such, society has had difficulty promoting that which is 
essential for human happiness. The sciences and the arts, still failing centuries later to represent 
man’s true nature, are pernicious to human happiness. The only option going forward is to turn to 
the humanities in the effort to restore to them the credibility that they once commanded. 
Restructuring of the humanities, in order to ensure that its foundation is firmly based upon reason 
and revelation, will aid society in discovering how to be virtuous within civil society. Although 
this too, presents its fair share of difficulties, we cannot continue upon our current trajectory – 
which has led to unanswerable ethical questions and great political and ideological rifts.  
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In dismissing the arts and sciences, as pernicious to human morality, Rousseau claims that 
what the mind has come to need is not necessary for good society or human happiness. In doing 
so, Rousseau is not suggesting that what the mind needs is more base than what the body needs; 
but that, in a world without a purpose, it is better to be happy and content with one’s self than have 
numerous material possession and be miserable. As a society, we have decided to pursue the 
sciences and the arts – the acquisition of wealth – over happiness and virtue. We have chosen this 
path without being cognizant of the gravity of our decision. We have forgotten that mankind was 
once happy without education, and many of the luxuries of modern day life. Even in his defense 
of a free and liberal society, Rousseau seems to question whether it is actually best for man. There 
are many ways to form a society, but not all lead to human happiness. Rousseau himself took great 
joy in solitude. Long walks in the country allowed him time to think, free from the demands of 
others and allowed for the creation of his opus. This preference, like many others, fed Rousseau’s 
work, and it is for this reason that he has claimed man was better off before he formed society, 
which fed his amour proper, his selfish vanity. As such, Rousseau thought of politics as a 
necessary evil – a compromise that was good for no one in particular but better than any other 
alternative.  It is possible though that Rousseau takes this philosophy too far, as even Jefferson, 
who wrote of the Country Yeoman was able to comes to terms with industrialization and 
commerce. 
Rousseau advocated for a democracy over all other forms of government. Democracy 
allowed for the equal input of individuals in all levels of society. This was desirable, Rousseau 
argued, as the poor and uneducated are more likely to be less morally corrupt than the rich. As 
shown in the Second Discourse, the rich have selfishly sought their gain over others, and at some 
point in time, those with money took advantage of their fellow man. By virtue of their position, 
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the rich have become experts at ensuring that events transpire in a way that is to their benefit 
regardless of the wellbeing of others. These actions are contrary to that of natural man and his true 
nature, and empathy as a general rule. It was the rich that invented the concept of slavery, and the 
vanity of the poor that prevented them from breaking free of these bonds. It is education and the 
ability to reason that precipitated the rise of inequality among men. With reason, not only did man 
become a slave to his desires, but he could become a slave to other men. There could be no such 
arrangement in the state of nature, because the need was not mutual and the slave could easily 
walk away from the master whenever he pleased.213 Within society, this is not possible. Slaves are 
viewed as their master’s property and both master and slave have need of each other, as they follow 
an arbitrary system of government. Such an arrangement continued to separate the rich from the 
poor extenuating the inequalities among men. Such enslavement has changed the very nature of 
man. This can be seen because the slave is content with the worst of chains but the free man is 
completely unwilling to be a slave and will do anything possible to retain their freedom – even 
suffering death. One must replace natural right with civil right, because when you have a slave you 
are asserting that a “man was not born a man.”214 Rousseau’s praise of democracy when the 
monarchy was still fashionable, as seen in the Epistle Dedicatory to the Second Discourse, was 
found to be highly controversial. Though times were changing, democracy was not a popular form 
of government. While Geneva, the place of Rousseau’s birth was considered a democracy at the 
time, it was more or less an expansive oligarchy – as a few wealthy families had control over all 
the political power. Rousseau praised democracy, as it allowed for individuals to retain an equality 
among themselves that was not found in other types of regimes. This equality of men allowed for 
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the moderation of wealth amongst individuals, and thus, prevented the exuberance of a few. The 
fact that democracy did not need to depend upon a group of wealthy individuals gained it 
Rousseau’s praise, as he claimed that luxury and idleness was the root of avarice and immorality. 
Wealth allowed for luxury and ease of living, which allowed man more time to act immorally. 
This immorality was perpetuated by man’s ability to reason, to think up ways he could fashion or 
create what was necessary for a life of pleasant idleness. As this luxury led to an individual’s 
participation in the arts and science, which in turn facilitated the ease with which an individual 
could live and create more, these modern activities were to be criticized. These developments, and 
man’s continued control over the ability to reason led to a society fashioned around the sciences 
and the arts. Because Rousseau is concerned with individual happiness, he points to a liberal 
society. A liberal society places great claim upon individual happiness. Individualism is part of 
our true nature as savage man, since we did not depend upon others or live within a society. 
Rousseau does not claim that humans are social creatures, but that we grew into this, as we were 
not originally part of a society.  
 
In the late seventeenth century, the earliest stretches of the Enlightenment, John Locke 
freed the acquisition of wealth. Merely a century later, Rousseau asserted that this went against 
the grain of human nature. Modern society has met every physical need of modern man, so why 
does such an acclaimed philosopher tell us that civil society is in fact disadvantageous? When 
Strauss calls our modern science “instrumental and nothing but instrumental,” it is because our 
modern science could just as easily provide advice “to tyrants as well as to free peoples,” and it is 
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only by luck that we do not have a tyrannical government.215 Rousseau, in decrying the immorality 
of the sciences and the arts, shows us how this could come to be. Rousseau notes that “[w]hile our 
sciences are vain with respect to the objects they pursue, they are even more dangerous in the 
effects that they produce.”216 As a society moves away from morality in favor of scientific 
innovation, the easier it becomes to simply examine what science is capable of rather than what 
science should be permitted to do. “Modern science does not claim wisdom or truth about the ends 
of life but instead focuses on methods of research that lead to the discovery of regularities, or 
‘laws’ of nature.”217 However, it does not examine the principles of human nature. Even modern 
day schools fail to show students how the natural sciences, social sciences, and the humanities fit 
together.218 “Our news magazines and daily newspapers report scientific discoveries but usually 
fail to consider how these findings should guide practical decisions.”219 Masters notes that because 
of this, “science is often mysterious and threatening for the public at large.”220 
Modern society must learn how “to make sense of competing perspectives in contemporary 
natural sciences, traditional philosophy, and the study of human behavior.”221 To do this, science 
and the humanities should be brought together to answer important questions – such as, “how 
should we live?”222 Masters says that how we live should be defined by the world around us. We 
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are not gods, and cannot separate ourselves from the laws of nature. Individuals in today’s society 
should be discouraged by the gap between science and morality. Schools have failed to make this 
connection, which is both “paradoxical and dangerous in a society whose economic health and 
military power are so dependent on technology and science.”223 Much of the political dissent in 
our society comes from the dysfunction of modern science. Many individuals do not have a proper 
guide to inform them on important decisions concerning modern scientific innovation including 
but not limited to birth control, abortion, human cloning, stem cell research, life support, organ 
harvesting, and euthanasia. Science can offer no moral guide. Politics, religion, and education are 
often dismissed. This had led to a great many factions within political society, and one of the most 
contentious political climates we have seen in decades. Political parties cannot agree how these 
policy questions should be handled. It is in these ways that the cultivation of the sciences and the 
arts have been pernicious to human happiness.   
 
ROUSSEAU’S PLACE IN MODERN DAY PUBLIC POLICY  
Such a harsh political climate and the inability of modern society to seek guidance in 
politics, education, or religion necessarily makes one question whether technological innovation 
as it is set up today is a threat to liberal society.224 To determine this, it is important to explore the 
question: “What is the place of science and technology in a liberal democracy in the decades 
ahead?”225 While science is constantly working towards facilitating the ease with which we live 
our daily life, it does not question what could be done to improve overall quality of life regarding 
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human happiness. As such, such grand innovation has consistently fallen short in examining what 
developments would also benefit the maturation of our morality. This is not to say that the sciences 
have not in some way been a positive force in society. Despite many inarguably great medical 
advancements, the sciences can in some way also be congratulated for negating the need for 
slavery; as running water – hot and cold – can be affordably accessed with the mere flick of the 
wrist within the comfort of our own homes. Unfortunately though, despite the many amenities of 
modern science, there are still slaves in modern day society. In fact, in modern times slaves are 
more numerous than they ever have been before, although they make up a much smaller proportion 
of the world than ever before – due to population growth.226  It is instances such as this that show 
that the moral decay of society is inescapable.  
Rousseau, in disparaging the arts and sciences, simply longed what was best for mankind. 
He noted that when he thought of morality he could not help but thinking with delight the 
simplicity of the first times.227 Rousseau thought that virtue and happiness should be preeminent 
– more important than even scientific advances. Although Rousseau’s philosophy is averse to the 
development of the sciences and the arts for most of society, which is a concept that seems to strip 
the enjoyments from modern civilization – this is not his intent. Rousseau is greatly concerned 
with human happiness and long as it does not conflict with morality. Rousseau realizes that human 
happiness does not have just one static definition, but that it changes throughout time and in 
response to certain outside influences. Savage man, prior to the first revolution and the 
development of language had a different definition of happiness than after the Great Revolution, 
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and the discovery of metallurgy and agriculture, which varied yet again from civil man’s definition 
of happiness. Man, at every stage of political development, has been forced to redefine happiness. 
With this progression, we see that this internal emotion has come to rely more and more upon 
external conditions, such as the opinions that others hold of you. With the progression of time, 
happiness has also become less obtainable, as it is dependent upon many more factors than it once 
was. This is a vicious cycle that ensures that our passions are always increasing with our ability to 
satisfy them. As soon as we can envision a useful development it is made and employed, and as 
soon as that fails to satisfy, it is human nature to go after the next new thing.   
It is important to remember that just because a certain thing is possible, the sciences need 
not pursue it. This has had precedence throughout history, although the guides that determine what 
should and should not be allowed must be strengthened. Certain societies, including the Greeks 
and Chinese which were very advanced, have turned away from the sciences at times, failing to 
develop technology as far as “their theoretical science made possible.”228 Writer Irving Kristol has 
attributed this to their knowledge that “science was only beautiful in a theoretical sense.”229 They 
understood that if they were to develop their theoretical knowledge “in practice, science and 
technology” would become “a form of power, which could be good or evil.”230 Unfortunately 
though, over time, the idea arose that “man could be trusted with this power.”231 It was the 
Enlightenment and liberal democracy that fueled this view and the notion that the technology that 
was made possible by scientific advancement should be made available to all. Kristol points out 
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that such assumptions are problematic, as was seen with the development of the atomic bomb.232 
Such doubts, he reiterates, have been increased by the destruction of earth’s ecology – the very 
basis of civilization.  Such actions show us that scientists frequently “do not think about their 
stature in the universe or on the evolutionary ladder.”233 Although we have developed this 
capability, it has been used very infrequently. The world has made great strides in reducing the 
technology that it employs in times of war. Pinker notes that “since 1964 as many countries have 
given up nuclear weapons as have acquired them.”234 Countries are often unwilling to use nuclear 
weapons except in the most extreme circumstances, risking a loss in war. This was shown when 
North Korea, North Vietnam, Iran, Iraq, Panama, and Yugoslavia, all defied the United States 
despite not having nuclear weapons. Such action has not been unprecedented, as a similar decision 
was made in WWII with poison gas. Waring adversaries – including Germany – did not use poison 
gas on the battle field as it was considered a faux pas. Ironically though, they had no such qualms 
domestically.235 Ultimately, man must realize that there is a limit to our “self-transcendence.”236 
Man cannot alter his position in the cosmos – even if he were to develop the necessary means for 
living on a planet other than earth.  
 
In his Second Discourse, Rousseau shows that mankind is better equipped to handle any of 
“the ferocious beasts they might meet up with in the woods,” than the “more formidable” ills that 
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are found within society.237 Society exposes man to illness and melancholy which are not common 
to animals or even natural man.238 Rousseau contributes the many misfortunes in the world to 
scientific exploration and vain curiosity, contributing many of the ills that man faces to having 
excess, Rousseau claims that many ills would be avoided “if we had retained the simple, uniform 
and solitary way of life prescribed to us by Nature.”239 Rousseau even goes so far as to say that it 
is better to die than to go to excess.240 Civil man also began to look to the opinion that others held 
of him to determine whether or not he should be happy, rather than simply being happy in his own 
right.  Natural man only needed to meet his needs for food, water, and shelter – while civil man 
must contend with the escalator of reason and the need for perfection. Rousseau shows that by 
placing such restrictions upon happiness, man has made a grave error in his understanding of what 
is best. Society was able to develop in such a way because man was negligent, failing to understand 
what would best suit his character. Throughout time, mankind has perfected many different fields 
of study, but he has not worked to gain a deeper understanding of himself and what would lead to 
human happiness. Rousseau clams that “the most useful and least advanced of all human 
knowledge seems to be that of man.”241 Man has not spent time exploring why he thinks what he 
thinks or does what he does and he does not understand what way of life will best suit his nature. 
Because of this, man has formed societies and made innovations which has only led to inequality, 
immorality, and man’s unhappiness. To know anything about man, Rousseau shows that it is 
important to understand man’s origin and, through this, his true nature. Man’s origin is the 
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necessary starting point, as Rousseau claims that there is no overarching aim for man or natural 
law which must be followed, so we can conclude that the circumstances of man’s origin provided 
a good and natural state for man. It is due to this lack of self-awareness that Rousseau criticizes 
man in his First and Second Discourse, and advocates for the acceptance of priorities that are much 
different than those that have been commonly held since the Enlightenment. To fully benefit from 
Rousseau’s writings, one must question why was it necessary to take the side of society – and why 
doing so must work against scientific innovation. It should also be noted that human psychology 
is the key to politics. A true understanding of man’s nature will ensure that we employ a political 
regime that is compatible with and capable of keeping our vices in check. Rousseau thought that 
the state of the world at man’s origin was good for him, and should be replicated to the extent 
possible under new historical conditions. While he may be right, in part, it is difficult to really 
know what the first man was like and how language and society truly formed. While there is 
evidence to suggest that much of what Rousseau theorized regarding the early origin of mankind 
is incorrect, contemporary anthropological accounts affirm Rousseau’s basic contention, that 
reason and language are emergent capacities. As such, it is worth giving careful consideration to 
his political science.  
 
 
IS ROUSSEAU’S PHILOSOPHY HOPELESSLY NAÏVE?  
Rousseau has stated that it was with the advent of the sciences that the morality of man 
began to decline, claiming that prior to the advent of scientific innovation man “had been content 
to practice virtue.”242 At first glance, this seems to be a farfetched claim. However, prior to the 
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sciences the best and brightest of mankind practiced philosophy and theology, spending their time 
contemplating the good life. Additionally, there were very few distractions for man prior to the 
development of the sciences, as man had to work hard simply to survive. This way of life left very 
little time for distractions, and harkens back to the correlation that Masters found between the 
advent of refrigeration and the drastic increase in divorce.243 While seemingly a confusion of 
causation and correlation at first glance, Master’s shows how divorce rates rose precipitously as 
more households obtained home refrigeration systems and a husband’s survival became less reliant 
upon his wife staying home doing the many household chores it took in order to ensure that he 
would not starve. By lessening man’s reliance on his wife, man was given more freedom to divorce 
her if he was so inclined. There is a Rousseauean logic to his finding: the advancement of science 
and technology created an environment in which men were free to want more – despite the possible 
pernicious effects for morals and the broader community. It is through luxury and money that man 
can obtain anything – allowing man to develop a god-like mentality due to the control that he can 
wield over nature.244  
For those educated in the modern principals of evolutionary psychology, we can see the 
numerous faults in Rousseau’s doctrine of the Noble Savage. However, we must remain cognizant 
that it is difficult to make sweeping assertions concerning human nature with any accuracy. Even 
today, we cannot know for certain what the earliest man was like or the exact parameters regarding 
the development of languages. One can make assumptions, as Rousseau did, but they will remain 
simply that. Even while the doctrine of the Noble Savage can be dismissed as a fallacy, there are 
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striking claims within Rousseau’s philosophy that cannot be dismissed as an error in judgement.  
Rousseau was right in noting that science and the arts can be pernicious to human happiness and 
that luxury and wealth have inadvertently contributed to man’s decline. Rousseau noted that “ever 
since the Learned have begun to appear among us, … good men have been in eclipse.”245 Rousseau 
even goes so far as to claim that if the sciences had never been developed and taught, people would 
not be “less numerous, any the less well governed, the less formidable, the less flourishing or the 
more perverse.”246 It is with this knowledge that Rousseau recommends that we reexamine what 
we hold to be our achievements, as they have actually provided very little that is actually useful.247  
 
A great deal of Rousseau’s work, especially the Second Discourse, was largely a  refutation 
of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679).248 However, when his work is examined as a complete opus, one 
can see that his work is much more than a simple rejection of Hobbes’s ideas. Rousseau puts much 
less emphasis on governance than does Hobbes, as Hobbes thought it was with government that 
man was at his best and Rousseau thought that it was within the state of nature. Rousseau 
“associated blankness with virtue rather than nothingness.”249 He thought that savage man was not 
“wicked precisely because they do not know what it is to be good.” 250 Throughout time, many 
social scientists have “glorif[ied] the noble savage” as he is “peaceable, egalitarian, materially 
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satisfied, and sexually unconflicted [sic].”251 However, modern evidence has shown that natural 
man was not constituted in this way. 
Rousseau was, in many ways, shaped by his time and the circumstances of his life. He was 
highly discontented, and lived “[i]n an age of loveless marriages of convenience and widespread 
adultery.”252  His writings in Emile has caused some women to challenge Rousseau based upon 
their limited role. Trouille argues that women of intellect did not fit into any of Rousseau’s neatly 
prescribed roles. Rousseau thought that humankind, and therefore reason, cannot be perfected. 
That the evolution of mankind is not possible as we are not moving toward a certain end goal, and 
because there is no way to improve. However, human nature and what will lead to happiness is in 
constant flux – it is useless trying to predict it in the future. This means little for Rousseau’s 
philosophy, though as it is our history that we should look back to, not to the many different 
manifestations of man. The only thing for mankind to strive for is upstanding ethics and morality 
and the ability to be unaffected by the opinions others hold of you – beyond this there is no ideal 
human behavior. 
 
CONCLUSION  
The rise of the Modern Era has led to a complete deviation from the contemplative way of 
the Ancients. This deviation has allowed us to abandon the cultivation of the human mind and 
study of our proper place in the cosmos in favor of the unreflective advancement of technological 
innovation. Modernity encourages the manipulation of nature, allowing human beings to live as 
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gods taking for ourselves what nature does not willingly provide. We have become so far removed 
from our true nature that we no longer use nature as a limit or even a guide. We have not stopped 
our scientific growth in order to inquire after the best possible good – from the perspective of the 
community’s common good or even individual happiness. In our constant struggle for the ‘good 
life,’ which always remains just out of reach, we have proven that we are capable of rising above 
nature, while our failure to put a check upon scientific innovation has prevented us from asking if 
this ‘rising’ is best for humanity.  
The dawn of the Enlightenment completely altered the trajectory of modern society; it 
embraced a new kind of dependence on technology, and has, with time, reduced the emphasis that 
was placed upon cumulative knowledge and the wisdom of the Ancients. We have become 
accustomed to our lifestyle and all its benefits, and we do not spare a second thought for the moral 
neutrality of science, as Value-Relativism has taught us that that which is not born of scientific 
innovation is insignificant and can at best be simply based upon a culture’s opinion. We have 
rejected the humanities as a possible guide because this field of study predated scientific 
innovation, and it is therefore not viewed as legitimate. However, the current ethical dilemmas that 
society faces should raise doubts concerning whether the onset of the Modern Era has helped 
improve the trajectory of human progress. Additionally, even if we fail to shake off the firm grasp 
of Value-Relativism we must remember that all knowledge, both scientific as well as that which 
comes out of the humanities, is based upon inductive reasoning. Because we are not gods, we can 
only put forward hypotheses. If they are not proven wrong, it is only then that they can be accepted 
as a theory. Even then, we are incapable of knowing anything for certain. However, through 
synthetic reasoning, it is possible to come to know whether a concept is closer to or further from 
what is naturally good – whether according to nature (as the Ancients would recommend) or as 
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Rousseau would have it, for human beings as the kind of creature we actually are (driven by reason, 
imagination, and emotional desire). The humanities then, are not all that different than the sciences. 
At their best, they hypothesize about the good life, test their suppositions, and work to uncover 
false assumptions in order to refine the understanding put forth. 
Hannah Arendt, in her article The Conquest of Space and the Stature of Man states that 
“[h]ad the scientist reflected upon the nature of the human sensory and mental apparatus, had he 
raised questions such as ‘What is the nature of man and what should be his stature?’” or “’What is 
the goal of science and why does man pursue knowledge?’” or “‘What is life and what 
distinguishes human from animal life?’” then man “would never have arrived where modern 
science stands today.”253 It is “political philosophy,” not “political science” that we must turn to 
when we try to determine how to move away from the modern predicaments that society is 
facing.254 It is important to facilitate a rebirth of the humanities so that they will not only be capable 
of governing the sciences but can recollect the teachings of the Ancients and the importance of 
collective knowledge. Recollection of our collective history is important for a well-functioning 
society, and we cannot turn away from what was known prior to the development of modern 
science and we cannot continue to govern as gods when we are no more than slaves. The important 
questions of our time must be answered by the culmination “moral and political philosophy,” as 
we will otherwise remain confined to within a society that does not provide for human 
happiness.255  
                                             
253 Arendt, Hannah. The Conquest of Space and the Stature of Man. (The New Atlantis: A 
Journal of Technology and Society. Fall 2007), 44. 
254 Irving Kristol. Is Technology a Threat to Liberal Society?  (The Public Interest. Spring), 50. 
255 Ibid., 52. 
78 
 
 It is impossible to ignore the imperatives raised by an ethically neutral society any longer. 
Science has failed to offer a moral guide. Politics, religion, and education in their current state 
have been dismissed as mere opinions of society. This allows for factions within political society 
to prosper and for Value-Relativism to flourish. We have great reason to worry as is shown not 
only in our day-to-day lives, but within progressive dystopian science fiction. The concern of these 
authors, as can be seen in the work of Kurt Vonnegut, Nancy Kress in Beggars in Spain, and Ray 
Bradberry in Fahrenheit 451, warn of these issues. Although popular culture can serve as a guide 
– and, at its best, even popularize salutary teachings –  novelists and movie directors are not up to 
the task of catalyzing a rebirth of the humanities. Society must find an alternate way to restore the 
crumbling pillars of Roman Law, Greek Philosophy, and Christianity, so they can once again bear 
the weight of a moral society.  
As always, the task of intellectual reform will fall to the academy, where our scientists, 
teachers and givers of culture are trained. First and foremost, scholars must advocate for the 
rejection of Value-Relativism as a way of life, the restoration of the legitimacy of the humanities, 
and restructuring of the fields of theoretical inquiry to ensure that they are based upon ancient 
wisdom and inductive reasoning. It is essential to stress the importance of synthetic reasoning if 
we hope to restructure modern society. Dialogue must be fostered and we must gather the many 
intellectual guides provided in order to have a basis with which to work from to discover a way of 
life that will work best for humanity. Such though is dependent upon higher education and in many 
cases revelation, which provides alternate reasoning for the same essential values of human 
goodness. Correct judgements of what is good or bad, right or wrong, noble or base, cannot remain 
dependent upon mysterious values, but must be found through the application of one’s rational 
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power and the synthesis of evidence and experience. Because synthetic reason must be taught, we 
can conclude that morality must also be taught.  
While the ancients knew this, we have long since forgotten. We have forgotten that the 
world provides various sources upon which we can ground our moral judgements, and we have 
forgotten that such judgements are necessary for a well-functioning society.256 Such education is 
not based upon vanity, but coming to know for a larger purpose beyond oneself, as can be found 
through revelation. Such a religion must be able to support a liberal democracy and its principles 
of equality and moderation of wealth amongst individuals. As a society, we must seek to 
understand the true nature of virtue, and once we come to an understanding, we must collectively 
learn to practice virtue, which is, according to Rousseau, a necessary precursor to happiness.257 
Thus, we can conclude that higher education based upon synthetic reasoning is essential for 
modern society. Such education would detail ethics and morality and what is necessary to remain 
virtuous in a society that often falls toward corruption when left without a guide.  
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